***ATP 3-18.4**

Special Forces
Special Reconnaissance

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Headquarters, Department of the Army

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Preface

ATP 3-18.4 supports the principles outlined in FM 3-18. ATP 3-18.4 provides the doctrinal basis for the conduct of special reconnaissance (SR) operations across the competition continuum.

As with all doctrinal manuals, ATP 3-18.4 is authoritative, but not directive. It serves as a guide and does not preclude Special Forces (SF) units from developing their own standard operating procedures to meet their needs. ATP 3-18.4 explains planning, roles, and various training that SF Soldiers participate in to conduct SR operations. Other SF principal tasks are described at length in the appropriate manuals.

The principal audience of this publication is commanders, staff officers, and operational personnel at the team (operational detachment–alpha [ODA]), company (operational detachment–bravo [ODB]), and battalion (operational detachment–charlie [ODC]) levels. This ATP is specifically for SF; however, it is also intended for use by Army special operations forces to improve the integration of SF into the plans and operations of other special operations and conventional forces. Additionally, the use of the term ODA does not necessarily refer to an entire 12-member detachment. SR teams are tailored for each mission.

Commanders and trainers should use this and other related manuals, in conjunction with command guidance, to plan and conduct successful SR operations. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates must ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels must ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and rules of engagement. FM 6-27 provides additional information.

ATP 3-18.4 uses joint terms where applicable. Select joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication is provided. ATP 3-18.4 does not add or modify any terminology found in the Army lexicon and is not the source document for any terms.

ATP 3-18.4 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of this manual is the U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, USAJFKSWCS. Send comments and concerns on a DA Form 2028 (*Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*) available on https://armypubs.army.mil to Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-SFD, 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-9610 or by e-mail to AOJK-DT-SF@socom.mil with an attached electronic DA Form 2028.

Introduction

JP 3-05 defines *special reconnaissance* (SR) as reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. These actions provide an additive capability for commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) actions. SR is one of the nine SF principal tasks. SR operations can support the execution of any SF principal task (such as unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, countering weapons of mass destruction, or direct action) and the operational or strategic objective of a combatant commander. The conduct of SR by SF Soldiers supports the operational concepts found in both joint and Army doctrine.

ATP 3-18.4 consists of three chapters and three appendixes.

Chapter 1 explains the nature of SR operations and describes the environments in which they are conducted. It provides the criteria for determining the difference between SR performed by U.S. Army SF and other types of reconnaissance.

Chapter 2 provides beneficial information for consideration during the mission analysis and employment process to ensure the desired information is collected in an efficient manner while maintaining an acceptable risk level to mission success and ODA survivability.

Chapter 3 emphasizes that there are no "generic" SR missions. Each mission has challenges that must be overcome through comprehensive planning. The goal of the planners is to identify those tasks that must be accomplished to execute the operational plan. Some tasks that will support the operation plan during the conduct of SR missions are geographic reconnaissance; target analysis; and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) reconnaissance.

Appendix A addresses the process of selection, construction, and occupation of fixed observation and surveillance sites used in permissive, uncertain, and hostile areas around the world.

Appendix B describes surveillance techniques. Surveillance techniques include the systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things. Visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means are used for these surveillance techniques.

Appendix C provides techniques that are intended to enable individuals to transmit information with or without supplemental digital images and to enhance their ability to convey critical information in an accurate and timely manner.

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Chapter 1
Overview and Fundamentals

This chapter explains the nature of SR operations and describes the environment in which they are conducted. It provides the criteria for determining the difference between SR performed by U.S. Army SF and other types of reconnaissance.

ROLE OF SPECIAL FORCES IN SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE

1-1. The conduct of SR by SF Soldiers supports the operational concepts found in both joint and Army doctrine. The Army's operational concept is the core of its doctrine. As stated in ADP 3-0, the Army's operational concept is unified land operations: how the Army applies combat power through (1) simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability, or defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), (2) to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, and (3) consolidate gains. Military forces seek to prevent or deter threats through unified action and, when necessary, defeat aggression. Throughout unified land operations, the Army conducts information operations in an effort to achieve information superiority. JP 3-13 states that *information superiority* is the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same.

1-2. SR operations support unified land operations through their contributions to information operations. The combatant commander establishes and maintains information superiority through *information collection*, defined in FM 3-55 as an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. Knowledge of the operational environment is the precursor to all effective action, whether in the information or physical domain. This knowledge requires aggressive and continuous R&S. SR operations apply the ODA's unique capabilities to meet the operational or strategic needs of the combatant commander.

RECONNAISSANCE

1-3. According to JP 2-0, *reconnaissance* is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. Units performing reconnaissance collect information to gain, confirm, or deny current intelligence or predictions. This information may concern the enemy or the terrain, weather, and population characteristics of a particular area. Reconnaissance normally precedes execution of the overall operation and extends throughout the area of operations. It begins as early as the situation, political direction, and rules of engagement permit.

SURVEILLANCE

1-4. JP 3-0 states that *surveillance* is the systematic observation of aerospace, cyberspace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. Surveillance involves observing an area to collect information. Limited-area and focused surveillance missions provide valuable information. Changes or anomalies detected during surveillance missions may generate a follow-on reconnaissance mission to confirm or deny the change. Surveillance missions are generally conducted from a fixed location or a series of fixed locations as opposed to reconnaissance missions that are inherently mobile by nature and include temporary halts and vantage points.

1-5. Long-range surveillance is the observation of an objective from a distant point. Long-range surveillance is far enough from the objective to be outside enemy small-arms weapons range and local security measures. Short-range surveillance is the observation of an objective from a position that is within enemy small-arms range and local security measures.

1-6. R&S missions provide the commander with the critical information necessary to attain situational awareness of the area of operations and influence. Through the procedural and intuitive assimilation of the information provided, the commander gains situational understanding.

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

1-7. To have situational awareness, one must immediately understand the conditions of the operation, as well as the time and geographical constraints. Simply stated, situational awareness is the understanding of the current environment.

SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

1-8. To have situational understanding, one must be able to apply analysis and judgment to relevant information to facilitate decision making. Situational understanding allows commanders to determine the implications of what is happening and to forecast what may happen.

1-9. SR operations are R&S activities conducted by special operations forces to obtain or verify information concerning the location, capability, intention, and activity of an actual or potential enemy. SR operations provide data in support of future operations. SR operations are special operations and include the following categories:

- **Target Acquisition.** *Target acquisition* (TA) is the detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of capabilities that create the required effects (JP 3-60). It includes all activities to acquire and collect information in support of future planning for follow-on lethal operations or for the interdiction of a specific target. These actions can be in support of a follow-on ODA mission or other strike assets.
- **Specific Data Collection.** Specific data collection consists of all activities to collect data for purposes other than targeting, such as planning for operations or missions that are intended to produce a nonlethal effect.

1-10. SF detachments conduct SR throughout the range of military operations in the competition continuum. SF Soldiers must be able to function in a variety of different capacities to maintain the ability to operate across this operational continuum.

1-11. Depending on the situation, SF Soldiers conduct SR operations in permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments. Each type of environment has slightly different operating requirements and characteristics.

1-12. SF detachments can conduct SR overtly, covertly, or clandestinely. JP 3-05 defines a *covert operation* as an action or activity that is planned and executed to conceal the identity of, or permit plausible deniability by, the sponsor. JP 3-05 defines a *clandestine operation* as an operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment of an activity, operation, or act. Operational security and secrecy are inherent parts of most, if not all, special operations. Operational security is not synonymous with covert or clandestine operations. SF detachments can conduct SR operations unilaterally, jointly with other Services, with multinational or coalition partners, or with and through indigenous or surrogate forces.

1-13. Reconnaissance is not determined to be special by the type of unit that is conducting the operation. Reconnaissance is considered SR when—

- The requirement is beyond the capabilities of conventional reconnaissance units (special skills, experience, and language or cultural knowledge).
- The nature of the operation makes it inappropriate for conventional reconnaissance units to conduct the operation.

1-14. ODAs possess unique skills that allow them to function where other units cannot. These skills include unique insertion capabilities, regional expertise, and advanced tactical skills. ODAs normally operate as part of a joint special operations task force. The joint special operations task force is a specifically designed task force capable of conducting a full range of special operations. It contains organic assets, such as special operations insertion and extraction platforms, signals intelligence collection capability, and special operations-capable combat search and rescue. These assets allow ODAs to operate in areas that do not have established military bases and lines of communication (LOC). The unique skills inherent within the

operational detachments, coupled with the capabilities organic to the SF group (and subsequently to the joint special operations task force), enable ODAs to mitigate operational risk to an acceptable level for certain operations. This statement should not be interpreted to mean that these capabilities equate to clearly quantifiable physical characteristics, such as distances, based on the contiguous operational environment. The contiguous operational environment represents a small portion of conflict, and the potential spectrum of conflict and modern technology has greatly enhanced the ability to collect this type of information. It is a misconception that SR missions are those that are too dangerous for conventional units or that the SF commanders are willing to assume greater risk with their forces.

NATURE OF SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE

1-15. SR operations normally have a defined scope and a preplanned duration and exfiltration. They are designed to answer specific, well defined, and sensitive priority intelligence requirements, information requirements, and specific information requirements of strategic or operational significance. SR operations may be conducted against targets at the tactical level when those targets are of particular importance to the joint force commander and mission analysis indicates that the outcome justifies the risk of using an ODA against the target.

1-16. Units must conduct a thorough mission analysis that defines the SR tasks they are likely to perform. They must then apply an appropriate mix of the skills and techniques acquired through training to accomplish a specific mission. SR training, therefore, depends heavily on the unit's mission essential task list derived from theater-specific requirements and may vary widely among units.

SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE TASKS

1-17. Success in peace, conflict, and war often depends on the commander's ability to achieve and maintain information superiority. ODAs can provide some of the most detailed information available for operational and strategic planners because of their unique capabilities, area orientation, and location in the operational area. This information can be used to reduce uncertainties and reduce risks to acceptable levels. Unless the mission is a planned armed reconnaissance, ODAs performing SR operations normally strive to avoid detection or compromise. SR missions must generally remain undetected to provide for protection and risk mitigation, as well as to help assure the integrity of the information gained. An enemy that has knowledge of the SR team's intentions or general location can effectively use disinformation techniques, which can have a potentially disastrous effect on future friendly operations. Appendixes A and B of this ATP contain detailed information on the execution of the typical SR tasks described below.

TARGET ANALYSIS

1-18. Target analysis is a continual process that begins in mission planning. Target analysis consists of the detailed examination of all information pertaining to a given target system, a subsystem, a complex, or a component. Target analysis determines vulnerability to attack, examines down time and destructive effects, answers a statement of operational requirements, or addresses objectives specified by the commander.

1-19. SF Soldiers conduct target analysis to allow for the most efficient use of resources. Sound target analysis provides options to planners, satisfies a statement of operational requirements, meets the commander's objectives, and reduces the risk to SR teams.

1-20. The criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability (CARVER) formula plays an important role in the target analysis process. Target analysis examines technically complex targets in the context of priority intelligence requirements, information requirements, and specific information requirements. It may be used to evaluate potential targets for follow-on special operations forces direct action or unconventional warfare operations. The CARVER formula may also be used to evaluate friendly installations or facilities as a basis for defensive activities. GTA 31-01-003 provides an example of a CARVER matrix.

TARGET ACQUISITION

1-21. TA for SR consists of the detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective engagement of the target by appropriate lethal or nonlethal means. The purpose of SR TA is to obtain information on target type, location, movement, development, strength, and vulnerability. Simultaneously, the ODA collects information on the weather, climate, and geography of the target area.

SPECIFIC DATA COLLECTION

1-22. Specific data collection is similar to TA but results in data for uses other than targeting. For example, conventional forces planning a contingency operation may require specific information on the trafficability of a given area, as well as the disposition or intentions of threat forces or civilians in an operational area. An ODA may infiltrate deep into a threat area prior to hostilities to obtain the required data. This task is different from an area assessment in that specific data is collected to support a maneuver commander. Specific priority intelligence requirements of an operational or strategically significant nature are required to justify the commitment of SF assets to such a mission.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND EXPLOSIVES

1-23. Reconnaissance conducted by ODAs may consist of the collection and evaluation of specific information about the presence (or absence) of CBRNE contamination. The information that is collected is used to determine the extent of contamination on specific terrain, buildings, equipment, and airspace in selected areas of strategic or operational significance.

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IMPERATIVES APPLIED TO SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE

1-24. The SF keystone manual (FM 3-18) explains the general application of the special operations imperatives to SF operations. The following paragraphs address the application of these imperatives to SR. SF commanders tasked to conduct SR must incorporate these imperatives into their planning and execution if they are to effectively use their forces.

UNDERSTAND THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-25. In SR, SF Soldiers must have a firm grasp of the political, economic, sociological, geographical, psychological, and military aspects of their operational environment. They must understand their circumstances and be ready to respond to rapid changes in a manner that ensures survival and mission accomplishment. They must answer the following questions:

- What are the collection requirements?
- Why is this information required?
- What are the threats and other operational conditions?
- How can tactics, techniques, and procedures be adjusted for optimal success?
- How can perishable opportunities be exploited in a timely manner?

RECOGNIZE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

1-26. The role of SF Soldiers is frequently a supporting one that creates the conditions for decisive nonmilitary or military activities to occur. When conducting independent SR operations during armed conflict and competition below armed conflict, commanders must focus primarily on the political effects of their activities. Even when supporting conventional military contingency operations, commanders must realize that political implications often remain significant. Commanders must clearly understand that the political environment is paramount to fully incorporate the strategic and operational information operations/information superiority plan. These objectives need to be considered and weighed during the planning cycles for tactical and nontactical operations alike. The potential second- and third-order effects resulting from hostile or civil engagement could either be quite beneficial or significantly negative, requiring valuable time and effort to redress. In the current global operational environment, the perception of an action can be more valuable than its direct physical result.

FACILITATE INTERORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION

1-27. Special operations are planned at every level, from the joint task force to the special operations task force. SR operations are an essential tool for commanders to collect, process, and disseminate information. As part of intelligence operations, SR missions must accommodate the specific information requirements, priority intelligence requirements, information requirements, and information requests generated by other agencies. These requests should be in accordance with established request channels or issued through collection taskers assigned by a higher level of command by means of a collection matrix. Planners must synchronize collection efforts, ensuring they are complementary and mutually supporting. These actions will present commanders with an expanded picture of the operational area. Appendix C describes information reporting.

ENGAGE THE THREAT DISCRIMINATELY

1-28. ODAs are a limited resource the Army cannot easily replace. This fact, combined with the often sensitive political implications of SR operations, requires commanders to assess carefully the SR requirements against the loss of this valuable asset. Planners must also consider collateral damage to civilian property or compromise of the ODA by noncombatants.

ANTICIPATE LONG-TERM EFFECTS

1-29. SF commanders must take a long-term approach to the issues. They must place each individual event in a broader political, military, and psychological context to avoid strategic failure while achieving tactical or short-term success. Short-term transitory gains, such as observing secondary roads or trails, do not meet the strategic threshold for utilizing ODA assets. They should, however, be used for surveillance in anticipation of a first strike and use of special weapons systems by a threat to aid in identification of a threat's operational or strategic military capabilities.

ENSURE LEGITIMACY, CREDIBILITY, AND TRUST

1-30. Commanders must insist that their legal advisors (normally found at the group level) review each operation plan for violations of established laws and criteria of success. Commanders must consider moral legitimacy, as well as legality. For example, would the compromise of a deployed ODA produce adverse effects on these areas?

ANTICIPATE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS AND THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION

1-31. SF commanders must clearly understand the psychological nature of the SR mission. Commanders may initiate SR activities specifically to produce a psychological effect. For example, an ODA may be sent across a hostile border deliberately to leave a sign of its presence. Such an action is intended to indicate to the government of that territory that the U.S. Government has the capability and the will to conduct operations against it or to provoke it in a certain way. Plans should include both the psychological exploitation of success and contingency plans for minimizing the damage of mission failure or compromise. All planners must integrate psychological considerations into every SF mission to ensure suitable results.

OPERATE WITH AND THROUGH OTHERS

1-32. SR planners must determine specific information requirement indicators to minimize the need for direct observation of the target. This analysis permits ODAs to gather the required information with a minimum of risk. As an alternative to physical presence, SF should emphasize the advice, training, and assistance of indigenous military and paramilitary forces. The prime use of indigenous forces is to permit deniability and create a desirable force-multiplier effect. ODAs can utilize reports from indigenous forces to gather required information without actually placing direct surveillance on a target. When being used in the operational area security role, ODAs can have indigenous forces emplace sensors within those areas/parts of a target that cannot be observed thereby serving as early warning for the friendly force. Sensors can classify targets by the number of personnel, wheeled vehicles, or armor, and their direct of movement.

ENSURE LONG-TERM ENGAGEMENT

1-33. During long missions, such as surveying a threat transportation system, the ODA must be able to sustain protracted operations. The key to ensuring long-term sustainment is early identification of the expected duration of the mission. It is necessary for ODAs to plan for essential supplies to cover a specific timeframe because of external support limitations.

DEVELOP MULTIPLE OPTIONS

1-34. In a dynamic and volatile environment, ODAs must maintain maximum operational flexibility through a broad range of SR options. They must maintain the ability to shift from one option to another before and during mission execution. ODAs not only should focus on the optimal method of mission execution but also should address unanticipated success. They should also focus on putting the commander in the best possible position in the operational environment in the event of failure. Selection of alternative indicators, observation sites, and objectives are all critical aspects of mission planning.

PROVIDE SUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE

1-35. SR missions not only gather information for, but also depend upon, accurate and timely intelligence. This fact is especially true in fluid, high-risk environments. ODAs conducting SR missions require a detailed target intelligence package (TIP) as part of their mission preparation. FM 3-55.93 provides a target folder format, which is a good starting point when creating a TIP. The lack of a thorough TIP may cause delays to, or the abortion of, the SR mission. For example, a lack of information on area security around a special weapons site creates an unnecessary risk to ODA personnel. Another consideration is that planners depend upon sufficient intelligence in order to task appropriate units for a follow-on mission. Planners must consider whether the political gain may not justify the risk to ODA personnel. Information must be sufficient for subsequent operations, but the high risks associated with SR make gathering less-than-crucial information unfeasible.

BALANCE SECURITY AND SYNCHRONIZATION

1-36. Security concerns often compartmentalize SR activities, but compartmentalization can exclude key personnel from the planning cycle. SF Soldiers must resolve these conflicting demands on mission planning and execution. Insufficient security can compromise a mission. Excessive security can result in inadequate coordination, causing mission failure, duplication of effort, or fratricide.

SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE FUNDAMENTALS

1-37. ODAs may operate in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments at any point in the operational spectrum to conduct reconnaissance in named areas of interest and surveillance on specified highly profitable target areas of interest. As outlined below, SR must be purposeful, timely, secure, and reliable and accurate. It must also include detailed planning at the lowest level, stress flexibility, and emphasize stealth. Finally, SR missions require situational understanding of the operational environment. Depending on the level of risk to the force or mission, SR may also necessitate a bold and decisive approach.

PURPOSEFUL

1-38. SR operations are purposeful when they support specific, strategic, operational, or tactical missions and activities. An example of a purposeful SR mission is the prestrike and poststrike surveillance of major command and control systems that ODAs must neutralize before theater forces can undertake a planned follow-on operation. In addition, planners must weigh the potential gain versus the risk, as well as the cost of alerting the threat to friendly interests or intentions.

TIMELY

1-39. SR operations are timely when the commander, using the ODA, has the needed information in time to act on it in a way that promotes friendly interests. ODAs often transmit actionable information at the earliest opportunity. ODAs conducting SR operations must understand the information reporting requirements and any associated time constraints that affect their reporting abilities.

SECURE

1-40. Security relies on stealth, secrecy, and speed. Lightly equipped SF teams conducting SR operations will have a high risk of casualties if compromised. In general, these SF teams do not carry the bulky weapons needed to engage threat units for extended periods.

RELIABLE AND ACCURATE

1-41. SR operations are reliable and accurate when they generate detailed information about, and determine precise information on, reconnaissance targets. For example, detailed information of a top-view route sketch would depict identifiable features at each turn or distances between turns to aid the user. Precise information on a target house might depict length and width measurements for doors and windows for follow-on teams.

DECENTRALIZED PLANNING AT THE LOWEST LEVEL

1-42. As in all SF missions, those who will execute the mission must be the ones who develop the plan. Only the tasked detachments have the intimate, detailed understanding of the individual and collective capabilities necessary to create an effective plan of action. Decentralized planning balances the higher-level command's centralized mission coordination, deconfliction, and control by allowing the detachments to plan the execution of their assigned mission.

FLEXIBILITY

1-43. Commanders should stress flexibility in using assets. ODAs conducting SR operations must be committed to plans that give them the widest latitude possible consistent with mission requirements and the commander's intent. The plan must allow the ODA to survive unaided in the environment.

STEALTH

1-44. Stealth includes all efforts to minimize the operational signature to conceal the operation and its intention from the enemy. These may include—

- Infiltrating in a manner that conceals the insertion from the enemy. ODAs may accept a degree of risk to the force during infiltration in order to reduce risk to the operation. An example is the deliberate decision to insert without accompanying fire support platforms and combat search and rescue to mask the signature of the insertion platform. ODAs may conduct infiltration in conjunction with deceptive measures, such as false insertions or an existing pattern of reconnaissance flights.
- Minimizing radio signatures (ODA internal and with the higher headquarters).
- Using methods to blend in with the surroundings to prevent enemy detection or observation. This can include all techniques from the establishment of hide sites to masking the element's signature by using nonstandard equipment that will draw less curiosity or suspicion if observed by local inhabitants. This includes the use of civilian vehicles, indigenous attire, and local grooming standards. The ODA employs passive countertracking measures during movement to reduce their signature, such as good patrolling discipline; moving in multiple smaller elements instead of moving as one larger element.

SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-45. SR operations require situational understanding of the operational environment, which includes all efforts to maintain a localized situational awareness. In addition, this situational understanding includes—

- Leaving elements to observe insertion points to determine enemy detection or suspicion.
- Observing extraction points prior to their use to determine enemy detection and to prevent accidental compromise.
- Employing active countertracking measures to reduce the chance of the ODA being surprised.
- Monitoring enemy radio nets (by ODA or higher headquarters) to determine enemy detection.
- Recognizing indicators that the situation on the ground has changed, indicating enemy detection or a change in the templated enemy course of action, thus making the original plan invalid. Some indicators include the enemy's posture on an objective or the increased presence of security forces.
- Maintaining real-time connectivity with the higher headquarters to receive flash traffic or abort codes. This connectivity allows the higher headquarters to keep the ODAs informed of situational changes based on activities external to the local area, such as the compromise of another element in another area.
- Employing remote sensors or observation devices to augment the ODA members' observation of key areas or the collection of information in higher-risk areas.

SUPPORT OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES

1-46. Unity of effort must extend beyond other SF and special operations forces units. ODAs performing SR operations can also support conventional forces. This support may be answering specific questions, such as those on trafficability, or identifying infiltration corridors associated with engineer reconnaissance. Passing the requested information will eliminate the need to deploy another unit into the operational area and limit the risk of compromise to both units. The SF command element and the ODA must understand the prioritized collection tasks, reporting requirements, and reporting mechanisms to successfully support conventional forces in meeting their intelligence requirements.

RELATIONSHIP OF SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE TO OTHER PRINCIPAL TASKS

1-47. SF Soldiers seldom conduct SR operations as stand-alone operations. Bearing in mind that all operations require sufficient intelligence and reconnaissance for successful planning and execution, SF skill sets are generally inherent in all SF principal tasks. The paragraphs below provide more information on how SR supports the various SF principal tasks.

DIRECT ACTION

1-48. SF SR operations support direct action operations through the confirmation or denial of the location or presence of an enemy critical capability or node. SF Soldiers normally accomplish SR operations in support of direct action by using active reconnaissance operations to locate targets and confirm their presence, or by using passive surveillance operations to discern patterns and contribute to the accurate timing of follow-on direct action operations. SF Soldiers also conduct SR operations with an emphasis on signal intercept in order to gain information relevant to enemy capabilities and intentions, and possible future locations of intended targets. These targets may be personnel (such as enemy leaders and facilitators) or locations and are frequently in urban environments (such as enemy safe houses). Determining the location of this type of target is often impossible to do with a mechanical device alone.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

1-49. SR skills are integral to the success of any unconventional warfare operation. Unconventional warfare operations are activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. Thorough reconnaissance in an unconventional warfare environment is critical. The ODA assisting the indigenous forces must be aware of the adversary's location and capabilities as much as tactically feasible, if not at all times. SR operations in an unconventional warfare environment not only collect information relative to engaging or avoiding the enemy, but ODAs also utilize them to assess atmospherics in an area of interest, to identify advantageous locations to conduct recovery operations, and to serve as reconnaissance for follow-on supporting forces.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

1-50. SF SR skills are well suited to a number of activities in stability operations, such as foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency operations, and security force assistance. SF SR skills can support all missions associated with these operations by conducting collection efforts, such as prestrike and poststrike information and intelligence, route reconnaissance, and populace atmospherics collection. SR is often the subject of training with host-nation military and paramilitary forces in order to build their military capacity.

PREPARATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT

1-51. SF SR operations support information operations and contribute to information superiority by filling intelligence gaps identified during mission analysis. Collecting the information and intelligence required by the commander's critical information requirements assists the commander and staff in gaining situational awareness and situational understanding to protect friendly information assets and operations while exploiting the enemy.

COUNTERTERRORISM

1-52. JP 3-26 defines *counterterrorism* as activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals. The involvement of ODAs in counterterrorism is limited by host-nation responsibilities, U.S. Government lead agency authorities, legal and political restrictions, and appropriate Department of Defense directives. When directed by the appropriate authority, designated ODAs conduct or advise host-nation forces on SR operations to support counterterrorism missions that include—

- Rescuing hostages.
- Recovering sensitive material from terrorist organizations.
- Attacking terrorist infrastructures.

COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

1-53. Countering weapons of mass destruction involves actions taken to locate, identify, seize, destroy, render safe, transport, capture, or recover weapons of mass destruction. ODAs may employ SR as an element to support a countering weapons of mass destruction mission.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

1-54. Operational forces always need "eyes on" and, in the past, ODAs conducted SR operations to provide this support. These SR operations provided units with an ability to respond to the actions of enemy forces with a high degree of accuracy.

1-55. SR missions conducted during the Vietnam conflict played a key tactical, operational, and strategic role in the commander's plans. One example from the conflict in Vietnam that lends credence to the importance of SR is Project DELTA. Conducting SR operations in enemy-held territory for over five years, Detachment B-52 of the 5th Special Forces Group, collected information on an unsuspecting enemy, which often determined North Vietnamese intent and capabilities. The detachment's actions often led to the interdiction and disruption of LOCs for personnel and material, upsetting or canceling untold numbers of operations against South Vietnamese and U.S. conventional forces.

1-56. In Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, U.S. Army SF performed SR operations in several forms. Several ODAs worked in concert with the Saudi forces, providing critical border surveillance and early warning during the period of the expected Iraqi offensive. Prior to the start of the ground offensive, SF elements conducted specific data collection to validate offensive campaign assumptions. At D-day, H-hour, SF elements were already performing SR information collection missions designed to provide information on Iraqi force movements along the LOCs deep behind Iraqi lines. This knowledge provided the combatant commander and ground tactical commanders with vital information on Iraqi defensive intent and counteroffensive capabilities. In 2003, ODAs again performed SR operations in the region in a similar fashion during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

1-57. SR operations conducted in Central Asia (Afghanistan) played an important strategic role in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Frequently, unique situations were encountered during the conduct of SR missions. For example, ODAs operated at an altitude in excess of 10,000 feet and in terrain that was all but impossible to negotiate (in some cases, it took as long as six hours to move four to five kilometers). These SR operations prior to the launch of direct action strikes were vital to the success of these operations and resulted in a limited number of casualties for both civilian and operational personnel.

1-58. In all cases, the supported commander must provide guidance that clearly articulates the relative importance of collecting the information in relation to the detection or compromise of the reconnaissance force. For example, it may be more important to remain undetected than to gain the desired information. Potentially alerting the adversary and allowing them to know friendly intentions gives them the opportunity to prepare against the reconnaissance team.

Chapter 2

Planning

This chapter provides beneficial information for consideration during the mission analysis and employment process. In addition, this guidance will help to ensure the ODAs collect the desired information in an efficient manner while maintaining an acceptable risk level to mission success and ODA survivability.

MISSION ANALYSIS

2-1. Understanding the purpose of the mission will have a significant impact on operational decisions. It is important to understand the unique aspects associated with each of the SR categories because they have implications for the techniques employed and the consideration given with regard to acceptable risk during the conduct of the operations. This chapter describes the SR categories in more detail.

2-2. For purposes other than targeting, collecting information in support of follow-on offensive operations can generate different requirements than collecting information to satisfy the commander's critical information requirements. In some circumstances, the value of information can be time sensitive. This is often the case when locating a mobile target, whether it is a certain enemy weapons platform or a specific high-value individual. Some information can retain its value even if the enemy detects the collection effort, whereas other types of information are rendered useless by enemy detection. An example of this contrast could be the determination of an objective's actual function as a terrorist training camp (contrary to its declared purpose)—compared to the determination of the presence of prisoners on an objective in support of an impending rescue operation. The enemy likely vacates the terrorist training camp after detecting the collection effort, unlike the prisoner-holding objective. Tactical commanders need to understand these nuances to properly balance the risk they accept versus the potential gain during the conduct of the operation. In some cases, threat knowledge of friendly collection efforts will disclose friendly interests and perhaps future intent, thus allowing the threat to prepare for planned friendly operations. In this case, compromise of friendly collection efforts would be less desirable than failure to collect information. Planners should outline this criterion in the commander's intent.

2-3. The mobility of the ODA is very often critical to the successful execution of the mission, and to the survivability of the detachment. For most SR missions, little more than mission-essential equipment should accompany the ODA. As a result, the ODA does not ordinarily possess the personnel, weapons, and ammunition necessary to survive sustained enemy contact. At a minimum, a detailed fire plan is necessary to cover the ODA's movement to and from the objective. Planners must pay attention to the environment in which the mission will be conducted, and the appropriate fires assets should be chosen to provide the desired support while limiting unnecessary destruction and casualties. Very often in today's combat environment, U.S. fires assets will not have the availability or the range to assist the detachment during the entire conduct of the mission. Occasionally, it may be necessary to use multinational or coalition fires assets to contribute to a more complete and, if possible, layered fires plan to support the mission.

2-4. Mission planning is vital to the success of the mission. The plan addresses the type and location of observation sites, duration of surveillance, number of personnel, and special equipment. Once surveillance is established, it should be continuous for the specified period. Complete coverage of the objective and redundancy are ideal but require multiple surveillance sites, continuous surveillance, and 360-degree coverage. While desirable, this requires more personnel and therefore increases the chance of compromise. The ODA selects primary and alternate surveillance sites during the planning phase. Planners select surveillance sites based on physical reconnaissance (stay-behind operations or an indigenous source), aerial observations, imagery, line-of-site data, soil and drainage data, and map reconnaissance. Another important factor for mission planners is the communications plan. If the team is unable to relay the information back to the higher-level headquarters, then follow-on missions may not succeed. Appendix C provides more details on communications planning.

2-5. Detailed mission planning assists in ensuring the success of the mission and survival of the team. GTA 31-01-003 provides details on the military decision-making process. The ODA determines the composition and equipment of surveillance teams based on the mission and operational environment. The minimum requirements to successfully plan a surveillance include the following:

- Mission statement, to include the area or objective placed under surveillance, eyes-on-target time, and anticipated length of mission.
- Priority intelligence requirement, information requirement, and specific information requirement.
- Enemy situation in the target area.
- Higher-level commander's intent for intelligence.
- Infiltration plan with recall plan and abort criteria.
- Fires plan, to include assets available.
- Exfiltration plan.
- Communications plan.
- Linkup plan, if applicable.
- Resupply plan.
- Emergency extraction plan.
- Evasion and recovery plan.

2-6. During the planning process, particular attention should be made when analyzing historical enemy activity. This includes previous use by coalition forces during time of conflict. Local inhabitants are highly aware of suitable or overused sites.

2-7. Significant threats to improvised warning and explosive devices should be included during the planning process. Previously emplaced unmarked, unexploded ordnances and/or deterrent munitions from past conflicts may be buried by natural causes over time.

2-8. Surveillance missions are specific. They require detailed planning and support the overall collection plan. The surveillance team carefully plans and coordinates missions to prevent duplication of effort, conflicting requirements, and possible overlapping or intermingling with other friendly forces in the area. Coordination with other units for insertion or passage of lines is critical to ensure each unit is prepared to execute the mission in accordance with the requirements and expectations of the other units involved. This is the time to deconflict problem areas and to modify plans or procedures as required to successfully execute this phase of the operation.

2-9. Enemies operate within complex terrain to evade U.S. weapon systems and advanced, combined arms air-ground capabilities. The enemy may operate in and among populations to evade detection, preserve their combat power, and retain their freedom of movement. The enemy can establish relationships with local, regional, and transnational criminal organizations and violent extremist organizations to finance their operations and gain access to illicit trafficking networks for the movement of weapons, munitions, people, narcotics, or money. Enemy organizations can employ tactical and technical countermeasures to counter U.S. operational and tactical advantages. Tactical countermeasures include deception operations, dispersion, concealment, and the intermingling with civilians in urban terrain.

2-10. Operations by surveillance teams in areas forward of friendly lines can create possibilities for fratricide. To protect surveillance teams from friendly fires, the following coordination should be conducted prior to insertion:

- Coordinate for and include proposed surveillance sites in restricted and no-fires areas through the controlling headquarters.
- If teams are to operate in areas where restricted and no-fires areas are not feasible, obtain the information and brief the teams on planned strikes and warning procedures of impending friendly fires or air strikes.
- Conduct detailed planning and coordination in situations where a surveillance team may linkup with advancing friendly units. The team must be familiar with the linkup procedures. As details become available, the surveillance team is informed of the necessary frequencies, call signs, code words, locations, and post linkup relationships and activities.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING

2-11. Contingencies planning is paramount for a reconnaissance element. As part of a plan, contingencies need to be understood before an element inserts. Even the best plan can change once the element hits the ground and assesses the situation. Additionally, the element must fully understand the rules of engagement in the event an emergency assault must occur.

2-12. Planning for fire support during an SR mission may be required. The six elements of a call for fire include: observer identification, warning order, target location, target description, method of engagement, and method of fire and control. Regardless of the method used to designate a target location, the call for fire is normally sent in three transmissions, consisting of six elements, with a break and read back after each transmission. The information is sent for each transmission as it is determined rather than waiting until a complete call for fire has been prepared. ATP 3-09.30 provides more information on observed fires. The transmissions and elements are organized in the following sequence:

- Observer identification and warning order.
- Target location.
- Target description, method of engagement, and method of fire and control.

SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE CATEGORIES

2-13. ODAs conduct SR in support of other SF principal tasks. The following are categories of SR operations and their defining attributes, as well as employment examples.

TARGET ACQUISITION

2-14. The ODA conducts SR for the purpose of TA to locate targets or provide information on them. Its primary goal is to find the target. An example of finding the target is to verify the emplacement of mobile weapons systems at prepared launch sites. The second goal is to provide or update information on known or suspected targets. If the information is for a follow-on direct action force or other assets to engage the target, priority intelligence requirements and information requirements must address the specific information requirement. During TA, the ODA continues with the area assessment process and reports changes that could hinder the follow-on operations. Some planning considerations include the—

- Desired effect.
- Coordinated ground or signal linkup with conventional forces.
- Coordinated fire control measures.
- Political considerations.
- Effect on and reaction of the local populace.

2-15. Another unique capability that an ODA can execute when performing TA is destroying or attacking a target after acquisition. This could occur for a variety of reasons. For instance, an ODA may receive the mission of confirming the existence of a bomb-making facility and subsequently be tasked with destroying the facility. Confirming the facility exists can answer intelligence requests about the nature of operations at a specific location. The ODA conducting TA could be ordered to destroy the facility after acquisition because of its close proximity (if they have the means to accomplish the mission) or the lack of other assets available to accomplish the mission. Another example of attacking a target after acquisition can be described using an individual as the target. An ODA conducting TA may be ordered to neutralize the target individual because of the time-sensitive nature of the mission (the target individual is departing the area). The ability to destroy or attack a target after acquisition without being ordered is only used in extreme circumstances because of a possible compromise of the ODA and the loss of its reporting capability.

SPECIFIC TARGET RECONNAISSANCE

2-16. With increases in urbanization, many target sets appear in complex urban settings that minimize or negate the capabilities of other technical collection assets. ODAs may perform reconnaissance to confirm the location or status of a target prior to follow-on operations. Once a specific target is confirmed, additional surveillance may be conducted to further develop the level of detailed information about the target. During TA operations, ODAs have the capability to conduct limited unilateral interdiction and to provide terminal guidance to or support for a follow-on strike element.

2-17. When conducting operations in support of follow-on strike operations, the R&S element must be able to provide information to the mission planning agent and be in direct communication with the follow-on mission command during execution. To ensure synchronized execution of a target, reconnaissance elements need to be familiar with the strike unit's requirements, as well as their standard operating procedures for planning and executing operations. As the SR team compiles information, it may be incorporated into a target folder for later handoff to another force or be directly incorporated into ongoing planning with a strike force.

2-18. A technique to ensure effective integration of information into a strike force's planning is to have an SF liaison element, perhaps even members of the SR ODA, colocated with the strike force headquarters. The specific function of the colocated personnel is to assemble and present the data as it is collected. This element is sometimes referred to as a tactical information center.

ARMED RECONNAISSANCE

2-19. Armed reconnaissance operations are operations that have the primary purpose of locating and attacking targets of opportunity. The purpose of these operations is to deny the enemy freedom of action and disrupt the coherence and tempo of its operations. To sustain this effect in a given area over time, forces must avoid becoming decisively engaged or overextended during deliberate engagements. If friendly forces are rendered combat ineffective, based on a single engagement with enemy forces, the overall intent of the operation is degraded. ODAs conducting armed reconnaissance and area denial missions must also weigh the potential impact of their actions. They must quickly ascertain the potential impact of engaging a target of opportunity, especially when noncombatants or other local assets are at risk. ODAs must decide if the potential risks, both to the force and to the mission, are worth the exposure of the reconnaissance element and the potential for an engagement.

2-20. ODAs have unique environmental, cultural, and linguistic skills and infiltration capabilities that allow them to operate in remote environments often inaccessible to other units. They also have the ability to maintain a level of lethality or operational capability without creating a large signature. This ability allows them to conduct reconnaissance over a relatively large area for a sustained period in search of threat activity and potential targets. These armed reconnaissance operations can force an enemy to commit or divert significant combat forces to retain or regain control of territory, as well as to alter or suspend operations because of pressure from an ODA. These operations can achieve significant effects with a relatively small investment of combat power.

2-21. ODAs preserve operational flexibility during armed reconnaissance operations by maintaining an ability to use a variety of techniques based on the specific situation. These techniques could include—

- Terminal guidance operations.
- Attacks with—
  - Standoff weapons.
  - Suppressed weapons.
  - Explosives.
  - Mines.
- Direct assaults.

2-22. ODAs perform armed reconnaissance missions by balancing mobility and firepower, as well as the desire to locate the enemy or interdict threat use of an area, while maintaining acceptable risk. Techniques include the following:

- Be selective about accompanying equipment. An ODA cannot be prepared for everything and remain sufficiently mobile. Mobility is likely to be as critical to sustained survivability as firepower is to short-term survivability.
- Cross-load equipment/vehicles so they are as self-sufficient as possible.
- Use equipment or clothing that reduces U.S. signature, which will possibly reduce indigenous curiosity or concern.
- Avoid setting patterns.
- Engage the enemy from a position of strength relative to the enemy's strength.
- Operate in small elements to maintain a low signature but retain the ability to come together for support of a specific operation if necessary.
- Maintain a link to on-call air support, emergency recovery, combat search and rescue, and possibly, a quick-reaction force.

SPECIFIC DATA COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

2-23. Specific data collection is the most common task associated with SR operations. Normally, an ODA conducts specific data collection as a collateral requirement of SR—the requirement to infiltrate, to operate, and to exfiltrate undetected. The most common types of specific data collection include line of communications (LOC) surveillance, specific target surveillance, information collection, and signal interception.

LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS SURVEILLANCE

2-24. In LOC surveillance, the ODA infiltrates a joint special operations area and establishes surveillance along the specified LOC. The LOC could be a major highway, a rail line, or even a waterway along which significant traffic passes or is expected to pass. The ODA then collects and reports information concerning activity along the LOC based upon predetermined or specified significant indicators. These indicators are normally pieces of equipment, types of units, or certain types of activities. The indicators may be innocuous, but their presence or absence along the LOC may provide significant operational or strategic intelligence. Examples of significant indicators are CBRNE delivery means, chemical decontamination equipment, air defense artillery system radars, special purpose troops, large or unusual troop or equipment convoys, refugee movements, specialized unit equipment, security force activities, or heavy construction activities.

2-25. Surveillance of LOCs provide the combatant commander or joint task force commander "eyes on" (real-time information of threat operational or strategic intent). ODAs receive this tasking because the surveillance is beyond the capability of other means or the tasking authority needs the flexibility that SF teams provide.

2-26. The success of ODAs conducting this type of surveillance often depends on their ability to avoid compromise. Operational security requirements drive many of the considerations that determine the means of infiltration and exfiltration, as well as the surveillance and observation techniques and the equipment selected to perform the mission. Almost exclusively, these missions will require static observation techniques. Movement equates to compromise. The ODA must consider the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) when selecting LOC observation sites. Site selection drives the ODA's ability to place constant observation on the LOC. Use of visual observation aids (binoculars, scopes, and cameras) and thermal or infrared devices increases the ODA's standoff distance and lessens the risk of compromise. Poor weather or heavy vegetation may require the ODA to use multiple sites to achieve constant observation.

SPECIFIC TARGET SURVEILLANCE

2-27. Specific target surveillance is much like LOC surveillance. For example, an ODA assigned this mission type infiltrates and observes a specific target, location, or activity, such as threat strength or activity at a suspected supply base, prisoner of war compound, air base, or missile launch site. Unlike LOC surveillance, the ODA does not have the same options in selecting its observation sites when conducting specific target surveillance. The ODA may be limited or restricted in terms of how they use vantage points to accomplish the mission. The ODA uses the mission variables to assist in selecting proposed sites.

2-28. ODAs conduct specific target surveillance missions to collect, confirm, or refute intelligence about a target. Once processed, this information is used to plan interdiction missions or to support direct action missions against the targets in question. The ODA tasked with the surveillance mission does not routinely transition to conduct direct action operations against the target. That mission will normally be tasked to another ODA that will specifically plan direct action operations against the target, using the information provided by the SR element.

2-29. Normally, an information requirement for these missions is very precisely worded. If vaguely presented, the ODA ensures clarification early in the mission planning cycle. Often, the information requirements, or their associated reporting requirements, determine the observation site selection or the surveillance technique selected to affect the mission. For example, a large compound can require the use of multiple sites to ensure sufficient coverage. These large targets present command and control problems, and heighten the risk of compromise. Multiple sites pose special problems for the ODA's communications capabilities, especially in the numbers and types of radios required. Multiple surveillance sites also require the ODA to determine its internal communications needs, whether the element acts independently or in coordination with other elements. The ODA always balances security considerations against execution techniques. A key to mission success during SR is the ability to infiltrate the target area, gain all available information, and exfiltrate while the threat remains unaware of the ODA's presence.

INFORMATION COLLECTION

2-30. ODAs conduct some SR missions to collect information previously unknown, or to refute or confirm specific information about a target that does not neatly fall under the category of surveillance. Examples of these types of SR missions include CBRNE agent confirmation; soil, water, or air surveys or samplings; mute reconnaissance drop zone or landing zone surveys; or any other specific data requirements. In most instances, such a mission is limited to the specific data or indicators required.

2-31. Often, these missions require the ODA to conduct mission-specific skill training or to accept augmentation by non-SF subject-matter experts. Augmentation may entail a CBRNE team, topographic or civil engineers, explosive ordnance disposal Soldiers or Sailors, or scientific specialists, such as toxicologists or meteorologists. When augmentees accompany an ODA to conduct a mission, both should participate in special premission training as a team. Regardless of the rank of the augmentees, the ODA is responsible for safe infiltration, security, and exfiltration, as well as reaction to contingencies. Specialists focus on their specialty, whereas the ODA supports them. Once the ODA collects the information, it forwards that information to the special operations task force. The ODA must know when there is enough information to warrant a report.

SIGNAL INTERCEPT

2-32. An ODA tasked to conduct signal intercept operations requires extensive language and equipment training. For this reason, the special operations team–alpha (SOT–A), found in the battalion military intelligence detachment, is attached to an ODA to conduct signal intercept operations. Signal intercept missions, both voice and code, are closely controlled by the theater intelligence center. The SOT–A collects information that may have tactical, operational, or strategic value. In most instances, this information passes from the SOT–A and ends at the special operations task force's sensitive compartmented information facility.

2-33. When the SOT–A performs this type of SR operation in a hostile environment, it is normally attached to an ODA. This augmentation occurs because the military occupational specialty training of the SOT–A covers only general Soldier skills and its signal collection training. The ODA conducts joint mission planning and premission training to ensure all participants understand their responsibilities.

AREA ASSESSMENT

2-34. SF personnel perform area assessments to update existing area studies or determine specific pieces of information. SF personnel do not necessarily need to collect this information in a tactical manner, as with collecting information pertaining to enemy forces, but rather collect or compile this information in a low visibility manner. In some cases, the assessment is conducted with regard to an area's overall suitability for a follow-on operation. Detachments can conduct a variety of environmental surveys because of the unique skills inherent within SF. These may include, but are not limited to, the types of surveys described below.

Hydrographic Surveys or Reconnaissance

2-35. SF personnel can perform a wide range of tasks associated with maritime operations, such as hydrographic surveys, beach surveys, waterway reconnaissance, and port reconnaissance. ATP 3-18.12 includes a detailed explanation of waterborne operations.

Geographic Reconnaissance

2-36. ODAs may be tasked to collect geographical data, such as route surveys and drop zone or landing zone surveys. SF personnel can survey airfields for suitability, but the element or organization that intends to use the survey must provide the specific information requirements required to use an airstrip. ODAs can be augmented with U.S. Air Force special operations forces that specialize in airfield surveys. It is unlikely that ODAs would be tasked specifically to collect geographical data; however, doing so could be a supporting task conducted in conjunction with an existing mission.

Structural Surveys or Reconnaissance

2-37. ODAs can collect data pertaining to the suitability of airfields, bridges, and port facilities. This collection could also include poststrike assessments to confirm battle damage. Not all surveys are SR operations, but surveys can be part of an SR operation. A survey differs from a reconnaissance in the level of detail permitted by the environment. Surveys are normally suitable for information on targets, or targeted areas of interest, while possibly in enemy territory but not directly under enemy control. Areas of interest under direct enemy control normally preclude a survey and require collection through R&S.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Reconnaissance and Surveillance

2-38. In specific instances, ODA personnel can augment or be augmented by CBRNE personnel organic to the SF group, such as the personnel from the group chemical reconnaissance detachment; or technical experts from outside the group, such as chemical and biological survey inspection team personnel, technical support unit personnel, or Department of Energy personnel. These CBRNE technical experts conduct reconnaissance in a wide range of forms. For example, overflights can be used to look for dead vegetation and wildlife. However, if a possible CBRNE area is encountered, commanders will have many questions, such as—

- When and where did the CBRNE strike occur?
- Will the threat continue using CBRNE weapons?
- Were the weapons effective?

2-39. Given the effectiveness of modern weapons, questions concerning CBRNE use will have a high priority on the lists of priority intelligence requirements and information requirements. One of the first questions should be whether anything happened at all. For example, industrial accidents or attacks on industrial facilities often produce effects similar to CBRNE strikes. However, if CBRNE use can be confirmed, the battlefield commander is then permitted to request a response in kind. The joint force commander would task the SR team through the special operations joint task force to obtain samples and information that confirms or denies CBRNE use. ODAs supported by group chemical assets, such as the chemical reconnaissance team, can perform this type of mission.

2-40. The primary problem with using SF Soldiers to conduct CBRNE reconnaissance is that extensive training and equipment are required that are not normally afforded to ODAs. This void was identified and filled by chemical reconnaissance teams that have been assigned to SF groups. The chemical reconnaissance team has the special skills and equipment to conduct this hazardous mission when augmented to ODAs.

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Chapter 3
Execution Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

There are no generic SR missions. Each mission has challenges that must be overcome through comprehensive planning. The goal of the planners must be to identify those tasks that must be accomplished to execute the operation plan. Some tasks that will support the operation plan during the conduct of SR missions are geographic reconnaissance, target analysis, and CBRNE reconnaissance.

OPERATIONAL PHASES

3-1. SR operations often contain the following five phases:

- Insertion.
- Movement to the objective.
- Collection on the objective.
- Movement from the objective.
- Extraction.

Note: Planning, although critically important, is not considered a phase of the operation. Depending on the environment and nature of the operations, each phase listed above may not be applicable.

INSERTION

3-2. Insertion is the tactical placement of forces into enemy-controlled territory by assets or resources nonorganic to the inserted element. Insertion can be onto a target area, but more often with SR, infiltration includes insertion into the enemy held territory plus ground movement to the collection area. Insertion can be into a denied environment such as an enemy's rear area or an uncertain environment such as contested territory (under enemy control) within a friendly country's territory. Uncertain environments represent areas in which the host-nation government or occupying power cannot guarantee security.

3-3. Insertion is likely to be the portion of a mission in which the ODA has the least amount of control over the environment. If other assets are delivering the ODA to the insertion point, such as air or sea vessels, the element leadership needs to remain aware of the situation during the movement. All ODA members should keep track of the team's location during insertion, particularly after crossing into enemy-held territory. This is particularly critical in the event of mechanical failure or unexpected enemy contact. Regardless of the method, the tactical commander has the authority to abort the mission if the situation warrants such action.

3-4. Detection and compromise are different, and their consequences can vary widely, depending on the person or persons who observed the detachment. Detection occurs when the detachment has been observed but their identity and intentions remain unknown. Compromise occurs when the detachment has been observed and their identity and intent are known, which significantly endangers mission success and the safety of the ODA.

3-5. Immediately following an insertion, the force must assemble, and leadership must determine if the force has been detected. If detected, leadership must decide if the mission has been compromised. The detachment's insertion platform may have been electronically detected by enemy radar or heard by enemy units or civilians. In both cases, detection does not equate to mission compromise. Enemy units or civilians may be aware of the insertion, but the detachment's identity, insertion location, and mission intent may remain secure. Enemy forces may detect ground signs left by the insertion force, but effective route selection and countertracking techniques can conceal the detachment's direction of travel and objective. In some cases, leaving a small surveillance element or sensor behind to monitor the insertion point can determine if the force has been detected or compromised.

3-6. It is imperative the ODA accounts for all equipment and properly sterilizes the insertion point prior to beginning movement. Concealing parachutes or other equipment, such as fast ropes, can be time consuming and can leave considerable signature if buried. The ODA needs to give serious consideration to this problem during planning. Water obstacles offer a good solution for rapid concealment and, in some cases, later recovery. However, the ODA must ensure all equipment remains submerged to prevent compromise.

3-7. If a compromise has occurred, enemy forces will likely arrive in force at first light to closely inspect the insertion point. Enemy forces will likely include a quick-reaction force, local law enforcement for cordon, and tracking units. Time and space considerations will quickly become more critical to the detachment in order to determine whether to continue the mission or to abort and request extract.

3-8. If the situation permits, the ODA should try to reduce any indicators of its direction of travel. The ODA should use passive countertracking techniques when initially moving away from an insertion point. After insertion, an element should make brief communications contact with the higher headquarters as soon as tactically possible. This would normally occur after assembly a short distance away from the insertion point. The use of brevity in communications is vital to reducing signal signature, as well as the noise and movement signature required to send the message traffic. The initial entry report, proword ANGUS (FM 3-55.93), allows the higher-level headquarters to better track the status of the ground force.

3-9. If the situation is not conducive to establishing a radio link, ODAs can communicate with higher headquarters via codes used with current and emerging systems that provide situational awareness capabilities by identifying and tracking friendly forces. The higher headquarters can inform the ODA of flash traffic using satellite beepers that relay the message code as soon as possible. Higher headquarters can inform the ground force of any indications of detection by the enemy based on other intelligence operations, such as signals intelligence. Emergencies during insertion can also be transmitted to the higher headquarters via blue force tracker codes, if the codes are coordinated during planning.

MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE

3-10. The ODA's focus of effort during movement to the objective should be to reach the target without being detected or compromising the mission. The ODA may consider moving as a single element or moving in multiple elements to reduce its signature. The ODA should use passive measures to reduce its signature on the environment, such as taking care not to leave obvious footprints or to displace soil. The ODA should also use active countertracking measures, such as doglegging or fishhooking into position for long halts.

3-11. If the movement takes more than one period of darkness, the ODA members need to know how much time it will take to establish a concealed hold-up position over the daylight period. For example, if it takes three hours to establish a hold-up position and begin morning nautical twilight is at 0600, the ODA can plan accordingly and establish a hold-up position prior to morning twilight, which prevents visual compromise. Continuous night training on concealed hold-up positions lends to successful implementation during an SR mission. This level of planning will prevent site construction during the first hours of sunlight or construction on an unfavorable piece of terrain. In some areas, such as a jungle environment, movement in daylight is preferred. This is primarily because terrain hazards present a significant risk to the force or sound signature is more of a threat to compromise than visual detection.

3-12. ODAs should only conduct short halts in areas of advantageous terrain that conceal the element and offer some degree of cover. Members of the ODA should maintain close proximity to each other during halts to facilitate exchanges of information with minimal movement, but still offer 360-degree observation and security.

3-13. During long halts, the ODA needs to consider if the site will provide cover should the situation change. A site may look remote during one part of the day but actually have a lot of nearby movement in another part of the day. During periods of rest, it is possible for enemy posture to change. A hide site is a position that provides maximum observation of the target area while providing cover and concealment for the surveillance team. A hide site is also called a surveillance site when referring to SR. In many instances, this type of hide site differs from those used during sniper operations and during evasion. The ODA will not have an opportunity to enhance the hide site in response to an enemy's change in posture. Whether taking hasty or deliberate measures, the ODA needs enhanced camouflage and concealment to remain undetected and reduce the risk of accidental enemy contact.

3-14. It may be appropriate to establish a stationary command and control point, referred to as a mission support site (MSS). Normally, the MSS is at least a terrain feature from the objective and in a location that facilitates internal and external signal communications. From this location, individual elements launch to pinpoint the objective and establish surveillance positions. Circumstances may dictate the patrol to pinpoint the objective first and leave an element to observe the objective while the remainder of the patrol backtracks to establish the MSS.

3-15. As the ODA gets closer to the objective area or known danger areas, it should deliberately slow movement and increase caution. There are numerous techniques or measures that patrols can take when approaching potential danger areas. Examples of such techniques include deliberately increasing listening halts, slowing the pace of the movement, having small elements (two to four people) move in step to reduce noise, and allowing a gap between steps to hear noise. These techniques need to become routine during movement. The use of these techniques requires discipline and practice because members of the ODA will experience increased fatigue over time.

3-16. In all cases, a thorough and complete reconnaissance of the potential surveillance or observation points, the potential MSS, and the vicinity surrounding the team is highly desirable. To minimize signs of the ODA's presence and reduce the chance of compromise, the ODA should select the first location that satisfies security, collection, and reporting criteria.

3-17. MSSs and surveillance sites are tentatively selected during mission planning. Effective positioning of these sites occurs after insertion into the denied area. After insertion, the ODA can assess where to deploy the MSS and surveillance sites based on METT-TC. Dependent on METT-TC, two options are available for effective positioning of sites: co-location or multiple location. If colocated, the MSS and surveillance site can limit radio communications and movement in and around the target area, thus limiting chance of compromise. If the sites are in multiple locations, the distance between the sites could depend on the operating range of the ODA's internal communications capabilities. Primary internal communications are usually low power, line-of-sight radios. Having multiple site locations could increase chance of compromise during internal ODA communications and movement in and around the target area. However, having multiple locations offers increased perspectives on the target area. Effective positioning of sites depends on METT-TC regardless of the two aforementioned options.

3-18. Once near the objective, the element establishes an objective rally point (ORP) and a leader's reconnaissance is conducted to ensure the tentative surveillance site is suitable and the area to be observed can be seen from the site at ground level. The leader's reconnaissance then returns to the ORP and briefs the remainder of the team on the finalized plan. The ODA should designate a rally point along the route to the surveillance site. When approaching a possible objective area in a rural environment, elements should move perpendicular to the target because parallel movement is easier to detect visually.

INFORMATION COLLECTION ON THE OBJECTIVE

3-19. Infiltration is the arrival at the target site without enemy detection. This can be much more difficult in an urban environment and may require the assistance of local supporters. During a counterinsurgency operation, infiltration can occur during the conduct of normal operations in the form of a stay-behind ODA.

3-20. In general, it is desirable to have multiple points observing a named area of interest from multiple angles, for greater accuracy and complete coverage. Surveillance elements can be greatly enhanced by the use of SOT–As, whose capabilities provide them the ability to operate as part of the ODA. These surveillance teams operate as an additional asset in conjunction with the ODA. The use of remote observation cameras is an additional enhancement tool. If elements are observing a target or area of interest that is not currently occupied by enemy personnel, such as a road or bridge, establishing a hide site with maximum standoff might be appropriate based on reporting requirements. If enemy personnel occupy the target area, the ODA must be cautious to remain uncompromised while establishing surveillance positions. In this case, the ODA members should rely on enhanced camouflage and hasty site procedures. ODA personnel need to minimize their movement between positions in and around an objective and avoid creating trail signs to and from positions.

3-21. ODAs could be used to report information along main supply routes to and from the urban environment. Depending on the size of the urban area and location of key buildings, the ODA might report information on specific buildings or motor pools. ODAs might have to surveil a specific target from inside the urban environment. While conducting surveillance in an urban environment, ODAs must select a surveillance site that allows them to remain undetected. Considerations for site selection include camouflage, observation, and security. Appendix A describes site selection and construction for urban environments.

3-22. The expected duration of surveillance has a direct bearing on task organization. Two Soldiers can adequately maintain surveillance for 24 hours. Three Soldiers can maintain surveillance indefinitely. Four Soldiers allow the flexibility to send out reconnaissance, resupply, or linkup patrols. However, using greater numbers to conduct surveillance may increase the risk of compromise.

3-23. In some instances, long-term surveillance of a specific target may incur a high risk of compromise and become too risky to conduct follow-on operations. It may only be feasible to get within close proximity or observation range of a target for a short time. In these cases, the requirement may be to confirm the status of a target prior to the execution or commitment of a follow-on interdiction force. Additional information collected will provide value, but it is not the purpose of the operation or worth risking compromise to collect. In almost all cases, the collection requirements and the enemy threat will determine the method of reconnaissance or surveillance, special equipment used, and the amount of standoff exercised.

3-24. The ODA can employ various pieces of video surveillance equipment during the conduct of a fixed-site reconnaissance in an urban environment, such as the Special Operations Tactical Video System. This equipment will allow constant surveillance of the target and allows uninterrupted coverage during personnel rotations. This equipment simultaneously captures priority intelligence requirements and information requirements, and immediately transmits the narrated images. Using this equipment requires minimal movement and offers a reduced signature at the point of observation through the elimination of a human silhouette. The amount of standoff afforded will depend on the equipment's magnification capability and the presence of structures obstructing the view of the target.

3-25. The ODA needs to consider how they will relay information from the surveillance sites to the MSS, and consider the signature created, or risk involved, with internally transmitting to the ODA and externally transmitting to higher headquarters.

MOVEMENT FROM THE OBJECTIVE

3-26. As elements withdraw from observation sites covering the objective, there are several options to facilitate a smooth transition to exfiltration. Elements may withdraw and assemble at a known point, such as the MSS, or move to a predetermined linkup point if that is more practical. If there are multiple elements observing an objective, it may prove beneficial to have the farthest element begin withdrawing first while the other elements maintain observation of the objective. To avoid the possibility of multiple elements arriving at the linkup point simultaneously, ODAs will implement proper planning and command and control techniques. Multiple elements will not move to a predetermined linkup point with a planned simultaneous arrival. Leaders need to be clear in their understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of moving in separate, smaller elements and moving as a single element.

3-27. According to JP 3-50, *exfiltration* is the removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means. It can include movement away from the objective and the actual extraction of the force from enemy territory. In certain cases, ODAs extract directly from an objective.

3-28. Unlike during infiltration where firepower will not help the ODA reach the objective, during exfiltration, firepower might allow the ODA the ability to survive long enough to successfully extract. Once the collection is complete, other friendly actions may have removed any need for the SR element to remain undetected during movement from the objective or to the extraction point. If the ODA has been compromised and primary extraction is no longer possible, it may be more advantageous to sacrifice firepower for stealth and move in smaller elements to link up at an alternate extraction point.

3-29. ODA members should prepare for an extraction while under enemy fire before departing the objective or when at a safe distance from the target. They should ensure their magazines are fully loaded, canteens are topped off, and emergency rations are readily accessible and on their person. ODA members should also carry any intelligence material collected at the objective on their person rather than in their rucksacks. Team members should set up their rucksacks so they can access or remove equipment, such as radios or cryptographic material, during an emergency.

3-30. The ODA needs to know the status of the extraction site prior to withdrawing elements from an objective. Extraction sites, such as helicopter landing zones or beach landing sites, need to be confirmed for suitability and for a lack of enemy presence. Confirmation can be made by sending an element to observe the location prior to its use or by using unmanned aircraft systems. Whichever method is used to confirm suitability of a location, this confirmation needs to be made early enough to accurately assess the area and allow the ODA and the extraction platforms time to adjust their plans if necessary. Platforms might be able to move to an alternate site in a matter of minutes, but the ODA might need several hours. In cases of extraction from hostile territory, station time for extraction platforms and their supporting assets (such as combat search and rescue, close air support, and defensive air support) will likely be limited.

EXTRACTION

3-31. The surveillance team is extracted as quickly as possible after it has accomplished its mission. The ODA always plans and coordinates an extraction site with supporting forces. However, the situation may dictate the planned extraction is unfeasible and the team must exfiltrate. The surveillance team must be prepared to exfiltrate over predetermined land routes to friendly lines, either as a team or in small groups, or to exfiltrate to an area for extraction by air or water. Since SF surveillance missions are generally conducted deep inside enemy territory, distance usually precludes an all-land exfiltration. The initial phase of exfiltration may be conducted by land, but the exfiltration may end in extraction by air or water. However, the team must be prepared to exfiltrate the entire distance unassisted if necessary. The terrain is important when selecting the extraction location and means. The extraction site must offer favorable tactical considerations, pickup zone suitability, and cover from enemy direct-fire weapons.

3-32. Although insertion represents the period of greatest uncertainty, with the least amount of control over the environment, extraction may represent the period of greatest risk. Once an ODA assembles at an extraction site, it should maintain security but not expose its position until the platform is within sight. The ODA should anticipate the extraction platform and make contact with it on the ODA's internal frequency. The ODA leadership may also be in contact with other support platforms, such as AC-130s, that can provide improved security assistance, as well as fire support. The platform may request an additional confirmation signal to guide them in. The platform may also request any last-minute information, such as the ODA's orientation or known obstacles. During any signaling operation, the majority of the ODA needs to remain in a covered position. This is important in the event there is contact with the enemy during the extraction platform's ingress.

3-33. If there is contact with the enemy during the loading of the extraction platform, the ODA needs to decide whether to abort or proceed with the extraction. If it aborts the extraction, the ODA needs to signal the platform as soon as possible and to move toward cover. If it is proceeding with the extraction, the ODA needs to load as soon as possible. If the ODA becomes decisively engaged with the enemy during loading, the exposure time of the platform to hostile fire can significantly increase. If ODA members become mixed with enemy personnel, fire support assets can be prevented from engaging targets because of fratricide concerns. During the contact, the ODA can best facilitate successful extraction by rapidly accounting for all its personnel and conveying this information to the platform crew as soon as possible. Once colocated with extraction platform crew, ODA members can help direct fire support assets or provide supporting fire. During the extraction platform's egress, both the ODA leadership and its individual members need to remain aware of the situation in case of an emergency.

INFORMATION COLLECTION TECHNIQUES

3-34. An ODA uses numerous tactics and techniques to collect information during the conduct of SR operations. R&S are both tactical efforts to gain information. Reconnaissance is generally considered an active measure associated with locating a target or searching a specific area, whereas surveillance is generally considered as a passive measure associated with observation of a specific point or points of interest. Each effort has specific techniques that are applicable to the collection requirements and environmental conditions. Certain situations may require a combination of techniques to achieve the best results.

3-35. Collection efforts generally fall within one of the following two categories: collection of information on a specific point or target (sometimes referred to as TA) or information collection of a named area of interest/target area of interest. The latter is used to gather information of a more general nature not associated with a potential or identified target. Figure 3-1 shows collection of a specific point.



Figure 3-1. Collection of a specific point

3-36. A *zone reconnaissance* is a type of reconnaissance operation that involves a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries (ADP 3-90). ADP 3-90 also defines *area reconnaissance* as a type of reconnaissance operation that focuses on obtaining detailed information about the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area. Figures 3-2 and 3-3, as well as figure 3-4 on page 3-8, show different methods of collection over large areas.



Figure 3-2. Area reconnaissance—fan method



Figure 3-3. Area reconnaissance—successive sector method



Figure 3-4. Area reconnaissance—cloverleaf method

DETECTION AVOIDANCE TECHNIQUES

3-37. Avoiding detection and compromise is a prime concern of every Soldier. SF Soldiers have developed techniques that assist in avoiding detection. This chapter describes some examples in the paragraphs below.

STEALTH AND MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES

3-38. SF Soldiers practice a variety of stealth and movement techniques. Practice is especially critical for reconnaissance. Stealth techniques are important for the reconnaissance of defended targets where SF Soldiers may have to take several days to move a few hundred meters up to and around a target. SF Soldiers use basic stealth techniques, including any movement techniques that allow a low profile, slow movement, and the use of extensive camouflage. SF Soldiers can develop and train for many other stealth techniques based on METT-TC.

TRACKING AND COUNTERTRACKING TECHNIQUES

3-39. Another set of basic SF mission skills is tracking and countertracking. SF Soldiers use tracking to acquire a moving target. SF Soldiers use countertracking to avoid compromise and capture. TC 18-35 provides additional information on tracking and countertracking techniques.

UNEXPECTED CONTACT WITH ENEMY COMBATANTS

3-40. During operations in enemy-controlled territory, unexpected contact with enemy personnel is a constant possibility. Unless an event occurs that elevates the local enemy alert posture, enemy troops should not expect to encounter U.S. Soldiers. Chance contact with enemy personnel during an SR mission is a situation that creates some unique requirements compared to military forces conducting operations near the front lines with additional friendly units in the area.

3-41. During the conduct of SR operations, encounters with enemy personnel could become immediately violent. There is often a brief period of indecisiveness on the enemy's part because of a lack of understanding of the actual situation. Reconnaissance element leaders need to quickly assess the situation during impending encounters to capitalize on this time-sensitive advantage.

3-42. Regardless of the different languages of a region, it is obvious when an enemy soldier recognizes an individual as a threat by the enemy soldier's posture, tone of voice, and vocal inflection. Commands normally given under duress, such as "Do not move; put your hands up!" sound very different from questions such as "Who are you?" or "What are you doing here?" Reconnaissance personnel need to be able to assess the situation and compare the available options in a matter of seconds. "Who are you?" or "What is that?" at 25 meters can rapidly turn into "Do not move!" or enemy engagement at 15 meters.

3-43. If this type of situation presents itself, the element leader must respond as deliberately and calmly as possible while there is still uncertainty within the enemy combatants. Friendly forces should have no doubt if the element is an enemy combatant or not. Upon detecting movement or other unknown elements near the SR team's location, the SR team must evaluate the potential for detection and guard against remaining in a position until compromise is certain. It is better to evacuate the position and remain undetected than to remain in position and risk a potential engagement that may result in compromise and risk to SR team members.

3-44. If deliberate action is taken to end the contact through force, it should be applied with discretion and use of precision rather than with brute firepower. Handling the event with suppressed weapons or precise engagement can reduce the compromise to a local level. All members should be prepared to escalate hostilities immediately if the situation requires, but they should not automatically use the highest level of firepower possible.

3-45. As soon as they neutralize the immediate threat, team members should scan for other enemy personnel that may not have previously exposed themselves. Once the immediate area is secure, team members should establish accountability of personnel and equipment, sterilize the area by moving any bodies out of obvious sight, and consider searching personnel for any information that has potential intelligence value or that will aid in the ODA's survival, such as maps and handheld radios. Team members should attempt to render inoperable any useful equipment left behind, such as weapons or radios. Doing so could gain the ODA several critical hours before other enemy forces find the bodies and alert regional forces. This simple act could mean the difference between an early extraction and an emergency extraction while in enemy contact.

3-46. If one element is detected, all ODA personnel should give a situation report and be prepared to implement the previously established primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans. Making appropriate decisions during a crisis situation requires an understanding of the enemy's likely response capabilities over time. This response should not be confused with the enemy's most probable course of action in the event of compromise, which was developed during mission planning. Instead, it is the enemy's response capability concerning time and space. It needs to be clear to all ODA personnel, and it should apply generically across the mission area.

3-47. Deliberately killing civilians, even if they compromise your position, is never authorized, lawful, or appropriate. Civilians are not combatants unless they pose a direct threat to a Soldier's assigned forces. A civilian compromising an SR mission by calling the police or security forces is not considered a direct threat. Noncombatants can be immobilized and detained but cannot be deliberately placed in harm's way. Noncombatants shall in all circumstances be treated humanely.

3-48. After compromise or enemy contact, the ODA should reconsolidate and contact higher headquarters to inform them of the incident and seek further guidance. Higher headquarters determines if the information collected is still of value and, if it is, whether it is of high enough value for the ODA to accept an increased level of risk.

3-49. After notifying higher headquarters of a situation requiring assistance, potential fire support, or extraction assets, reconnaissance personnel should determine the following:

- How significant was the encounter? Contact does not necessarily equal mission compromise.
- Did anyone get away to alert other enemy personnel? What is the potential threat to ODA personnel?
- How much signature (noise, light, smoke, and so on) did the incident cause?
- What is the likelihood of someone having been within audio or visual range to act upon it?
- Do the individuals appear to be persons who will be quickly missed by their cohort?
- Did they have radios? Were they able to use them?
- Can the contact be contained to a local incident?
- Can the mission still be accomplished?

3-50. The ODA must make a careful and realistic assessment of the situation with regard to mission compromise and potential risk. In all cases, the ODA must guard against a potentially catastrophic situation brought about by wishing the detection or compromise away. Based upon a contact that has compromised or potentially will compromise the operation, the ODA can make a deliberate decision to request early extraction. Early extraction based on a deliberate decision to abort may require movement to an alternate extraction site to prevent compromising the intent of the operation. Emergency extraction is based upon the ODA having existing contact with the enemy, the ODA being in imminent danger, or an ODA member requiring immediate extraction due to a medical condition.

Appendix A

Fixed Observation and Surveillance Sites

An observation and surveillance site can be as simple as a prone Soldier in a defensive position or as elaborate as an underground complex constructed with polyvinyl chloride pipe and canvas with connecting transmission sites. The type, location, and operation of the site depend mainly on METT-TC. If the ODA determines that a fixed site is required during mission planning then site selection, security, construction, and occupation must be planned in detail and practiced. The variable associated with fixed SR sites is the geographic region in which the operation will take place. This appendix addresses the process of selection, construction, and occupation of fixed observation and surveillance sites used in permissive and hostile areas around the world. During this process, the ODA should apply the mnemonic BLUES (Table A-1). Appendix G of FM 3-55.93 provides detailed information on all aspects of hide and surveillance sites.

Table A-1. BLUES application

B	**Blend** with the surrounding area. Does the site look natural? Does it attract unwanted attention?
L	**Low-to-the-ground** construction techniques must be used. Does the site provide protection against small-arms and direct-weapons fire?
U	**Unexpected** sites should be used. Will the threat forces expect a Soldier to look out a window or a small hole in the wall?
E	**Evacuation** routes must be planned during site selection. What route(s) will the detachment use to evacuate the hide site? Where will the surveillance team go to link up with the remaining detachment members if the site is discovered or overrun?
S	**Silhouetting** the site is avoided by using the sides of hills, not the crests. Can a sniper see the surveillance team silhouette against the skyline, wall, or other object?

URBAN SURVEILLANCE SITE

A-1. Current and future combat operations require the ODA to operate in urban environments. Besides the physical challenges presented by complex terrain, the continuous interactions of numerous actors, each with their own agendas, objectives, interests, and allegiances, influence the operational environment and mission accomplishment. An urban or built-up area forms the economic and cultural focus for the surrounding area. It is characterized by a concentration of manufactured structures and facilities, and a concentrated population. ODAs may conduct fixed and mobile surveillance in urban areas. Urban operations normally require more sites than rural operations because of their generally limited fields of vision. ATP 3-06 provides more information on urban operations.

A-2. A surveillance team's success or failure greatly depends on each ODA's ability to observe the enemy with the least possible exposure to enemy fire. Hide sites in urban terrain are quite different from positions in rural terrain. The surveillance team can normally choose positions from those inside attics to those in basements at street level. These types of terrain are ideal for an ODA and can provide the team with a means of stopping an enemy's advance through its area. However, one important fact for the team to remember is that the enemy will use every asset it has in this type of terrain to detect a threat and eliminate it. There are two categories of urban hide positions: hasty hide and prepared hide.

HASTY HIDE

A-3. The ODA normally occupies a hasty hide temporarily. This position allows the ODA to observe the enemy while using available cover to gain protection from enemy fire. Common hasty positions and techniques for occupying built-up areas are as follows:

- Use drop cloths behind the team to cut down on silhouetting.
- Use room shadows during darkness.
- Leave blinds or shades drawn to a maximum to avoid being seen. The surveillance team must be careful to prevent the drapes or curtains from moving. This can be done by tacking them down or using sufficient standoff.
- Present no silhouette against a building or skyline.

PREPARED HIDE SITES

A-4. A prepared hide is built or improved to allow the surveillance team to observe a particular area, avenue of approach, or enemy position and to reduce exposure to return fire. Common sense, imagination, and theater rules of engagement are the team's only limitations in the construction of urban hides. The ODA must follow several principles in urban and field environments. In urban environments, the ODA must still avoid silhouetting; consider reflections and light refraction; and be sure to minimize muzzle blast effects on dust, curtains, and other surroundings.

CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN HIDES

A-5. The overriding requirement of a hide is that it must dominate the area that the surveillance team is responsible for and provide maximum observation of the target area. The team should get only close enough to provide observation without compromise. The ODA should stay at the second- and third-floor levels, unless the area of interest is on a higher floor in another building.

A-6. The locations of incidents that the surveillance team might have to deal with are largely unpredictable, but the ranges are usually relatively short. Consequently, a hide must cover its immediate surroundings, as well as middle and far distances. In residential areas, this goal is rarely possible because passing pedestrians force ODAs to choose positions that are not on the ground floor. It is not advisable for ODAs to choose positions above the second floor because that height greatly increases the dead space in front of the hide. However, this practice is not a cardinal rule. Local conditions, such as being on a bus route, may force the surveillance team to go to a higher floor to avoid direct observation by passengers.

A-7. In view of this weakness in local defense of urban hides, the principle of mutual support between hides assumes even greater importance and is one reason why coordination and planning must take place at the battalion level.

URBAN SITE SELECTION

A-8. METT-TC dictate urban site selection as with other observation and surveillance sites. ODAs can construct fixed urban sites in occupied or abandoned buildings, water tanks, shrubbery, on factory chimneys, in the attics of multistory buildings, or on other tall structures. If possible, ODAs should avoid wooden buildings and significantly deteriorated buildings because of the risk of injury from fire or structural failure.

A-9. When selecting a suitable site, Soldiers often have a tendency to select positions of height. In an urban operation, this can be a mistake. The greater the height attained, the more the ODA member has to look out over an area and away from the immediate surroundings. For example, to see the road below a tenth-floor surveillance site, observers must lean out of the window, which may reveal the surveillance location and may expose the observer to enemy fire.

A-10. Though the observer cannot predict where incidents will occur, the observer can expect that the ranges will be relatively short distances in an urban environment. The surveillance team must be able to observe the immediate surroundings, as well as middle and far distances if possible. In urban areas, this is rarely possible since line-of-sight is hindered, especially near ground-level floors.

A-11. When considering possible hide or surveillance positions, the team should consider old, derelict buildings as they are unlikely to be reoccupied by civilians in the area. Abandoned or unoccupied houses or buildings also offer good sites but could be booby trapped or be reoccupied by civilians. The team must search the building after they have occupied it. Buildings that provide protection from weather and small arms are preferred. They should avoid isolated buildings as they tend to be obvious observation positions. After carefully observing the inhabitants' daily routines, the team can occupy private residences. They can occupy the home and establish hides or surveillance sites in the basement or attic, or both, but the homeowner will pose a danger and the team should generally limit their stay to 12 to 24 hours. The team can use shops with empty accommodations on a second floor, but again should limit their stay to 12 to 24 hours.

Permissive and Uncertain Environments in Urban Areas

A-12. If operating in urban areas in a permissive or uncertain environment, surveillance teams may be mobile, using indigenous transport such as taxicabs, military vehicles, trams, bicycles, and subways. Taxicabs often have the advantage of carrying two-way radios. In permissive and uncertain environments, ODAs may emplace fixed and overt sites to serve as a deterrent by virtue of their mere presence. Where sites are overt, they must be mutually supporting and hardened enough to withstand threat attacks.

A-13. ODAs can make extensive use of fixed and roving surveillance to acquire targets or to assess their vulnerabilities. They will normally establish a hide position to conduct their surveillance.

Hostile Environments in Urban Areas

A-14. If operating in a hostile environment, fixed sites should not be in buildings that attract the threat's attention, but should be in rubble, yards, and gardens. If the site is to be set up in an undamaged part of the urban area, the ODA should select buildings of solid construction with serviceable stairs and basements that can be equipped for the rest and shelter of personnel in the event of artillery bombardment. ODA members may use surveillance equipment (live video) for a fixed location with limited access to mitigate risk of exposure. ODAs should implement this equipment and use tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to conceal device during the most feasible time.

URBAN CONSTRUCTION

A-15. During the reconnaissance of the surveillance site, the team plans the construction of an urban hide or surveillance site in detail. They must prepare a view aperture, a viewing platform (if needed), and the interior layout. Selection of the viewing aperture takes priority over construction of the viewing platform or any interior work. When construction begins, the team must pull local security to warn of any excess noise or act as early warning. If they have floor plans of the building or house during their planning phase, the team can rehearse the construction and occupation of the site. Before constructing a hide or surveillance site, the team records what the area looks like so that they can return it to normal before departing.

A-16. Site construction may consist simply of taking a position by a suitable viewing port, or it can be much more elaborate. If the ODA plans to use the site for an extended time, it must take steps to improve its ability to survive enemy contact by filling windows, doors, and other openings (bullet holes not used for observation) with bricks, fragments of building materials, or sandbags. The ODA should remove flammable objects from the premises. The ODA performs all construction mindful of operational security. Supplies of water and sand are assembled in the event of enemy detection and contact. If the threat has previously occupied the building, the ODA takes precautions against booby traps and mines. Where the threat is near, several places in the building are prepared for observation and departure. Inter-building monitoring and ODA communications are hard-wired if wire is available, although fiber-optic cables offer better security.

Camouflage

A-17. To survive in an urban environment, the team must supplement cover and concealment with camouflage. To properly camouflage their positions, they must study the terrain in the surrounding area. The site must blend in with the terrain. For instance, the team should not make a loophole for observation in an undamaged building. They should use only the materials that they need because excess materials can reveal their position. They should also consider—

- Using a backdrop to minimize detection from the outside of the structure.
- Hanging drop cloths to limit the possibility of observation from the outside of the structure, if adequate time and materials are available.
- Cutting loopholes in the drop cloth fabric to allow observation of the target area.
- Remaining aware of the outside appearance of the structure at all times. Firing through loopholes in barricaded windows is preferred, but the team must also barricade all other windows.
- Building loopholes in other windows to provide more than one observation position. When building loopholes, the team should make them different shapes (not perfect squares or circles). Dummy loopholes also confuse the enemy.
- Establishing positions in attics. The team removes the shingles and cuts out loopholes in the roof. However, they must ensure there are other shingles missing from the roof so that the firing position loophole is not obvious.
- Refraining from locating the position against a contrasting background or in a prominent building that automatically draws attention. The team must stay in the shadows when moving, observing, and engaging targets. They should avoid obvious locations.
- Remaining alert and remembering that armor-piercing rounds penetrate one or two low-density walls.

Note: The above factors explain why the surveillance team should construct more than one position if time and the situation permit. When constructing other positions, the team should ensure that it could observe the target area.

POSSIBLE HIDE AND OBSERVATION POST LOCATIONS

A-18. Common sense, imagination, and theater rules of engagement are the surveillance team's only limitations in determining urban hide or observation post locations. A restful position will increase the attention span of the individual on observation. The enemy can implant hasty improvised explosive devices in seconds. Therefore, it is important that the person on observation continuously scan the area throughout the watch. The following are options that the team can use to maximize cover and meet mission requirements:

- **Old Derelict Buildings**. The team should pay special attention to the possibility of encountering booby traps in old derelict buildings. One proven method of detecting guerrilla booby traps is to notice if the locals (especially children) move in and about the building freely.
- **Occupied Houses**. After carefully observing the inhabitants' daily routine, ODAs can move into occupied homes and establish hides or observation posts in basements and attics. The British in Northern Ireland used this method very successfully. However, these locations cannot be occupied for extended periods because of the strict noise discipline required.
- **Shops, Factories, Sheds, and Garages**.
- **Abandoned Schools and Churches**. When using abandoned schools and churches, the ODA risks possible damage to what might already be strained public relations. The ODA should not use these positions if they are still active buildings in the community.
- **Basements and Areas Between Floors in Buildings**. Although usable, these locations may not have windows or readily usable observation ports available. These locations require the ODA to remove bricks or stones without leaving any noticeable evidence outside the building. The ODA should try to locate those positions that already vent to the outside.

- **Roof Hide Site**. When preparing a surveillance position on a roof that has no protruding structure to provide protection, the ODA prepares the position underneath on the enemy side of the roof. The surveillance team removes a small piece of roofing material to allow observation of the targets in the sector and reinforces the position with sandbags. The position is prepared in such a way that the only sign that it exists is the missing piece of roofing material. The ODA should also remove other pieces of roofing to deceive the enemy as to the true observation position. The ODA should not be visible from outside the building.
- **Room Hide Site**. In a room hide, the surveillance team uses an existing room and observes through a window or loophole. The ODA can use existing furniture to establish cover, such as desks or tables. When selecting a position, the ODA must notice both front and back window positions. The ODA may need to use a backdrop to avoid silhouetting, such as a dark-colored blanket, canvas, or carpet, and a screen. Screens (common screening material) are important because they allow the ODA maximum observation and deny the enemy observation. The surveillance team must not remove curtains. However, they can open windows or remove single panes of glass. The ODA must remember they can randomly remove panes in other windows, so the position is not obvious. The ODA should tape all light switches in the off position to prevent them from being accidentally turned on. In addition, the ODA should place additional screening or burlap in front of and to the sides of the room's door, creating a vestibule. This practice will protect the observation post from outside light when personnel open the door. The clothes of the person on observation (sitting behind the screen) need to match the tone of the room. Desert utilities can work in white rooms, but the ODA needs dark clothes for darker rooms.
- **Crawl Space Hide Site**. When constructing a crawl space hide, the surveillance team builds the position into the space between floors in multistory buildings. Loopholes are difficult to construct in a crawl space hide. They are much easier to construct in damaged buildings. Escape routes can be holes knocked into the floor or ceiling. Carpet or furniture placed over escape holes or replaced ceiling tiles will conceal escape routes until they are needed.

URBAN VULNERABILITIES TO DETECTION

A-19. Infiltration of the team and its equipment may be the most challenging part of the mission as far as risk is concerned. Depending on mission requirements, the team could consist of more personnel than normal. In addition, the team could be encumbered with large amounts of surveillance and communications equipment. In response to this elevated level of risk prior to actions on the objective, teams must conduct detailed analysis of the mission and must propose that only the necessary personnel and equipment accompany the team into the target area.

A-20. The higher concentration of people, security forces, domesticated animals, lighting, and movement in urban areas requires ODA members to take additional precautions to avoid detection during their surveillance activities. ODAs in such situations may comprise teams of as few as two people who are working in civilian attire and using safe houses. Intra-team communications may require the use of very low-power radios and specialized technical and nontechnical communications means as a last resort when other means are inadequate or impractical. If operating from an occupied dwelling in a denied or contested area, the ODA must be careful not to consume more electric power or water than usual or more heating fuel than average for the normal number of occupants. Security forces can be alerted to the presence of ODAs by such minor indicators as sudden increases in milk deliveries.

A-21. Electromagnetic warfare technology has also advanced to a point where mobile units operating from the street can electronically survey a building to detect and identify very small sources of energy. This type of electromagnetic warfare intensifies if the presence of an ODA is suspected. Such capabilities are increasingly widespread and are often found in built-up areas of even marginally developed countries, especially in the "security states" of the third world. As a result, urban operations require extremely detailed planning in electromagnetic protection.

MOUNTAIN SURVEILLANCE SITES

A-22. Rugged, poorly trafficable terrain; steep slopes; and elevations above surrounding areas characterize mountainous areas. The number of observers and sites required may increase in mountainous terrain because of the relatively limited fields of vision compared to flat terrain. However, the number of observers required may decrease in areas above the tree line or areas in lower elevations that lack vegetation. A careful study of the target area will provide a good indication of the requirements. ATP 3-90.97 includes a general discussion of operations in mountainous areas.

MOUNTAIN SITE SELECTION

A-23. Mountain terrain provides many places for cover and concealment, a favorable elevation for long-distance observation, and often allows greater standoff to the target. Site selection is not guided by the height of a given mountain but by the irregular fields of observation, dead spaces, cover and concealment, and limits of the ODA's observation equipment. The ODA may use a circular, multi-tiered system of observers. The ODA situates sites not only with lateral dispersion but also with vertical dispersion to increase the daytime viewing capability. This layering of sites also reduces the need for movement when changing from daytime to nighttime operations. Since movement is the main cause of compromise, layering sites also adds to the security effort of the deployed ODA (figure A-1).



Figure A-1. Overlapping mountain observation sites

MOUNTAIN SITE CONSTRUCTION

A-24. The irregular terrain of mountains often affords natural hiding places for observers. In most mountainous areas, the rocky nature of the ground makes it difficult and often impossible to dig sites below ground. In those cases, the ODA may use boulders and loose rocks in aboveground construction of low-walled sites called scrapes. When constructing these sites, ODA members use the same degree of care in camouflage that they use in all other types of construction. The site must blend in with its surroundings and not be detectable from any angle. Fields of view can often be enhanced if the lower branches on the undergrowth are trimmed back with a wire saw, shears, or a knife. An additional critical consideration when constructing sites in mountainous areas is the requirement and method for effecting communications. For various communications spectrums, specific signal takeoff angle and azimuth are necessary. The MSS must allow communications to be made without the need for personnel to move from the site. Mountainous areas can also assist in masking communications signals and offer greater communications security to the team, thus reducing the likelihood of compromise.

MOUNTAIN VULNERABILITIES TO DETECTION

A-25. As with several other potential operational environments, mountainous terrain offers a variety of dangers to the team throughout the conduct of the mission. Infiltration to the proposed MSS and SR sites can be more difficult because of the unsure footing in mountainous areas and can pose a risk to team members carrying significant amounts of mission equipment. The potential for injury to team members and the resulting effect on mission success dictate that a detailed map reconnaissance be accomplished prior to insertion into the operational area. Noise signature is also a concern in most mountainous areas where teams will be conducting surveillance missions. Low-decibel noises can carry for great distances in these areas because the valleys can act as natural acoustic chambers. The team conducts thorough premission equipment checks on all personnel to ensure noise signature during movement is mitigated as much as possible.

NIGHT OBSERVATION IN THE MOUNTAINS

A-26. At night, the ODA may enhance observation in mountainous areas by sending out additional observers into valleys and hollows. Observation from below upward against the background of the sky often provides better results. Moreover, the ODA should supplement night observation by monitoring. Monitoring is more effective in mountainous areas than on flat terrain since sounds often funnel to the head of valleys and are perceptible at great distances. However, sounds in the mountains can be deceptive. Various obstructions can reduce the volume of sounds and change their direction.

SNOW IN THE MOUNTAINS

A-27. ODAs can use certain tactics to reduce the problems associated with operations in the snow, where snow is expected or known to be on the ground in mountainous areas. The following paragraphs describe some of these tactics.

Fixed Site Selection

A-28. While conducting a map reconnaissance of the area of operations in isolation, the ODA chooses sites in shaded areas and on slopes facing away from the equator: to the north in the Northern Hemisphere and to the south in the Southern Hemisphere. This preliminary site works to the advantage of the SR mission.

A-29. In moderate temperatures, the heat generated from the observers' bodies melts the snow on the cover of the site. However, melting snow around trees is common. The melting snow during the heat of the day often falls from the trees to the ground and, in turn, melts the snow on the ground. The melting snow falling off the trees often can be used as a water source. The shadows found around rock outcroppings and trees aid in hiding the foot trails leading to the work area and site. The shade aids in an even melt, which helps prevent compromise. Walking compresses snow under each footprint. The result could be a conspicuously muddy area in the snow where foot traffic occurred. The compressed snow melts at a slower rate than the surrounding snow. In areas where the snow melts fast, such as a sunny side of a hill, the compressed snow will leave footprints or trails leading to the site. Tracks left by boots and skis, as well as by vehicles, are almost impossible to camouflage effectively. However, additional snow and relatively high winds can assist in hiding the team's trail. Unless the team can schedule insertion or infiltration to closely precede additional snowfall, the team will need to study the enemy situation template for the area and decide which infiltration route will be the least likely to experience enemy patrols that could discover the team's tracks. In areas where snowfall exceeds a few inches, the team will leave unmistakable, long-lasting tracks. Countertracking techniques can be used to assist in the masking and dissipation of tracks, but a significant amount of time will be necessary for tracks leading to the team to be covered or to erode.

A-30. The constant daytime melting and nighttime refreezing of snow on slopes often result in avalanches. Using shadows and shaded slopes can reduce the risk of avalanches. Most danger areas are well-known and are often plotted on military and civilian maps.

A-31. Mission planners consider the advantages and disadvantages of using the infiltration aircraft very close to the target area. In remote areas of hard-packed snow, the rotor wash caused by a low-hovering helicopter may be more desirable than long footprint trails that can be easily tracked.

A-32. The duration of the mission in cold weather environments presents unique physical stressors, the most prevalent and dangerous being frostbite and hypothermia. To prevent these conditions, the team should consider the calculated use of fire during the conduct of the mission. The most effective methods of heat generation are the use of heat tabs and small camp stoves. Heat tabs are the most tactically desirable method, but they are less efficient than small camp stoves. Heat tabs are compact and leave no noise signature, but they do create a distinctive odor when burned. Camp stoves burn slightly cleaner, depending on the fuel used, but can create a significant amount of noise. For either method, the best time for their use is during daylight hours. During the day, noise is not perceived as far and there are more sensory distractions to the enemy. A heat source provides valuable functions such as melting snow for drinking water, heating food, and warmth.

Information on Snow Conditions

A-33. Multiple sources are often available for obtaining information about the snow conditions in different areas of the world. One of the most often overlooked is area tourist information services. In many countries, these services are often free and available to everyone. In addition, information on areas susceptible to avalanches is often available through maps, national or state forest services, or other government services. The ODA may also get information on daily snow conditions from area ski resorts. Combining the information with that obtained from the regular weather services can provide mission planners with a detailed picture of the area.

ARCTIC AREAS

A-34. Observation in arctic areas requires a number of special considerations. Observers must contend with extended light in summer and extended darkness in winter, along with cold, snow, ice, fog, rain, and sleet. In most cases, operations require at least six team members to ensure continuous observation and security. Shelter is critical for protection of the team and their equipment from the elements. When using cold weather sites, observers must take advantage of windbreaks, such as densely wooded areas, downwind sides of terrain elevations, and depressions. Where these features are not present or their use is infeasible, observers use other expedients, such as snow caves. In general, the four basic construction materials available in cold region terrain are snow, ice, frozen soil, and timber. ATP 3-90.97 contains a general discussion of operations on mountainous terrain. ATP 3-50.21 and ATP 3-37.34 describe shelter construction in cold weather areas.

DESERT SURVEILLANCE SITES

A-35. Deserts have a low average rainfall and a lot of sunshine. Plants and discernible terrain features are scarce in these regions. Deserts are characterized by sandstorms, dust, fog, and haze. The temperature changes drastically between hot days and cold nights. These are but a few of the problems that an ODA will face when in the desert.

A-36. Often, the desert is viewed as a desolate, uninhabited wasteland. The reality is in most sections of the desert there are towns, roads, Bedouins, animals, and intermittent activity. Without resupply, water usually becomes the factor that determines the duration of an SR mission in the desert.

DESERT NAVIGATION

A-37. Determining the exact position of an ODA or target on the ground in the desert is very difficult. Distant terrain features, mirages, and changing climatic situations hinder navigation. However, the United States developed the satellite-based Global Positioning System (GPS) to provide accurate position, navigation, and timing data to capable receivers anywhere in the world. Units should obtain one or more of these invaluable tools to ensure their accurate location. Civilian versions of GPS receivers are significantly more susceptible to jamming and spoofing than military receivers. For operations in the vicinity of a near peer, units should acquire a position, navigation, and timing receiver that also receives the BeiDou (China) or GLONASS (Russia) signals. Near peer adversaries are less likely to jam or spoof their own signals.

DESERT OBSERVATION TECHNIQUES

A-38. Mirages will affect observation in desert country. The cardinal direction of an observer to the target should be considered. An observer facing into the sun may be blinded for a portion of the day when observing points that face east or west. When the sun rises and sets on the observation line, more reflection is created from optics. At night, the observer should consider the direction of the moon. When using night vision devices in the desert, targets appear clearly when the moon is to the observer's back but are invisible when the moon is to the target's back. Frequently checking the terrain against the map aids the observer. However, training and experience play a critical part in accurately reporting the activities of the target. The ODA pays special attention in the still, early-morning hours when clouds of dust close to the ground do not conceal targets. During the day, the wind may disrupt or destroy camouflage completed during the night and make identification of threat positions considerably easier. Routine "stand-to" actions during sunrise may provide the best information of the day.

DESERT OPTICAL AIDS

A-39. Optical aids play a big part in mission success in desert regions. These aids may range from binoculars to high-powered night vision telescopes. Standard binoculars prove effective, even during the hours of darkness. Optical aids must hold a special place in the unit's mission-essential task list and be used routinely during training. The ever-changing technologies of optical aids have made it necessary to continue to adapt and purchase new accessories. It is important to rehearse with the equipment both during the day and at night.

DESERT VULNERABILITIES TO DETECTION

A-40. In many desert environments, the concern for countertracking is similar to that of a snowy, mountainous region. The team will need to be keenly aware of potential enemy activity in the mission area and to plan an infiltration route that mitigates the risk of detection and compromise as much as possible. In desert terrain, the team will be required to plan a route to potential sites that incurs less risk of injury to the team but maintains security through the mitigation of noise and light signature.

DESERT VEHICLES

A-41. Vehicles are used in the desert to move long distances and to carry the supplies required to sustain desert SR missions. However, fixed sites may be used as well. Where fixed sites are used, the positions are normally buried or semi-buried because of the lack of cover and concealment. These positions are often as much as 15 degrees Fahrenheit colder than the surrounding terrain and permit the ODA to operate for a longer time in the area. The team will also need to limit the method of transiting to the sites to foot movement because vehicular tracks remain longer and are more easily observed from greater distances than foot tracks.

DESERT SITE CONSTRUCTION

A-42. Deserts often have rocky soil or "surface chalk" soil, which makes digging difficult. Disturbing this "chalk" is a major concern when digging subsurface sites. In most desert areas, rocks and boulders are often used in site construction. Underground sites are also difficult to construct in soft, sandy areas because of sidewall instability during construction, occupation, and use. Sidewall reinforcement is usually required. Sandbags, plastic sheeting, and sand-filled boxes may also be used for containing backsliding soil. ATP 3-90.99 includes a general description of operations on desert terrain.

FOREST SURVEILLANCE SITES

A-43. Dense foliage, shrubs, and other vegetation with limited fields of observation and fire characterize forested terrain. Observation site selection is very important because of the limited fields of vision. During site selection, the ODA considers all the options available. Surface or subsurface sites or observers in trees all have different advantages. A careful analysis of the terrain is important to the success of the mission. Old growth and new growth forests have different characteristics. The main difference is the height of the limbs and undergrowth. Such information is required for selecting sites and planning movement times.

A-44. In a forest, observers often see less than they hear, especially at night. Monitoring the target area is critical to accomplishing the mission and providing the ODA with operational security. The observer can monitor the target in several ways. The observer can sit quietly with eyes closed to listen for sounds, or sounds of an area can be recorded on a tape recorder and played back at a louder volume into headphones. Remote sensors often play a key role in monitoring the target. Each SF group has sensors assigned to its military intelligence detachment. These sensors normally are easy to use and provide outstanding results.

FOREST VULNERABILITIES TO DETECTION

A-45. In forested areas, deadfall encountered during movement can cause the team to be compromised. The team should adjust the rate of travel in order to prevent haphazardly breaking deadfall, creating more noise signature than necessary. This proposed rate of movement should be planned for during mission analysis, and insertion/infiltration should be coordinated accordingly. The construction of sites should primarily be in areas that are shaded throughout the day. This will mitigate the risk of compromise because of disturbed vegetation, as well as the fading of dying vegetation the team has used to assist in camouflaging the sites.

A-46. During certain periods of the year, civilian activity could be common, or increased, in even the most remote areas. Increased civilian activity will occur in regions where hunting is popular or where wild fruits and vegetables are prominent, particularly when the item has significant market value. Modern technology such as Global System for Mobile Communications–enabled game cameras and live feed surveillance capabilities are also being integrated to protect valuable natural resources and could pose a threat to an ODA.

GROUND OBSERVATION SITES

A-47. Sites on the ground are camouflaged to resemble stumps, fallen trees, bushes, and similar features. For increased surveillance, the ODA locates the site to overwatch the intersection of fire lanes, roads, and footpaths on the edge of sparsely wooded areas and natural clearings. When available, obstacles such as creeks, ditches, or steep slopes should be between the site and the probable route of security forces. At night, even a small creek causes a threat force to make noise, disrupt formations, and move slower. All of these effects are to the advantage of the ODA.

OBSERVATION SITES IN TREES

A-48. A variety of skills are required for observation from sites in trees. The equipment requirements and planning considerations are different from those of ground sites. Observers for tree sites choose trees situated deep within the forest. They should never stand out in height, shape, or color. Observers are well camouflaged in the crown of a tree. Trees will provide good concealment for the observer even if the threat force is looking in the trees. The one key exception is when the observer is moving about in the site.

A-49. Another advantage of tree observation sites is that most people do not look more than two to three feet above their heads when walking. When travelers carry a load on their back, they often bend forward at the waist. Both of these actions prevent people from doing little more than looking at the ground to maintain their footing. However, slight movements in trees can be seen and heard for vast distances.

A-50. The primary disadvantage is getting into and out of the site. The observer in the tree must be covered by protective fire, which permits the observer to exit the location if detected or engaged by hostile forces. On the other hand, trees provide the advantage of a long-range view in open areas. In heavy-growth areas, the view may be nothing more than the tops of trees. This situation can be addressed through area studies and debriefing assets during mission planning. Employed ODAs should consider providing the observer with a small piece of flat wood to stand or sit on.

JUNGLE AND SWAMP CONSIDERATIONS

A-51. ODAs often conduct SR operations in humid, tropical areas with dense growths of trees and vegetation that reduce visibility to less than 30 meters. These thick growths provide the ODA excellent concealment; however, movement through dense jungle terrain is impeded by a time multiplication factor of two or three. ATP 3-90.98 includes more information about operations in jungle terrain.

JUNGLE AND SWAMP OBSERVATION SITE CONSTRUCTION

A-52. Most jungle sites used by ODAs are unimproved. The observers may do little more than lie on a poncho to keep dry and minimize disruption of their site. More-developed jungle sites are quickly constructed using easily procurable items, such as ponchos or natural materials. Planning considerations, such as high water tables, dense undergrowth, and tree roots, often require aboveground construction. Aboveground construction not only prevents flooded positions but also provides the observer the ability to listen and watch for movements in areas of standing water in the target area. ODAs give primary consideration to drainage, waterproofing, and avoidance of poisonous insects and reptiles.

HAMMOCKS

A-53. Lightweight, compact nylon hammocks are invaluable in jungle regions. The hammocks can be used for sleeping or for storage of equipment. The primary advantage is that the Soldier or equipment is elevated off the ground. Unlike the "swamp bed," the hammock does not require a lot of work to erect and is temporary in nature. ATP 3-50.21 includes additional information on swamp beds.

FLOATING PLATFORM

A-54. The floating observation platform is a structure used in areas where ground water is high or where there is a low-pressure resistance soil. This platform provides a floating base or floor where wet or low-pressure resistance soil precludes standing or sitting. The platform is constructed of small branches or timber layered over cross-posts distributing the floor load over a wider area. ATP 3-37.34 includes more information.

PLANNING

A-55. Surveillance planning is a vital part of the SR mission. Based on the analysis of the mission and target during isolation, the ODA intelligence sergeant develops a tentative R&S plan for placing the target under observation. The plan addresses the location of observation sites, the duration of surveillance, the number of personnel, and types of special equipment to be used. Planners consider the use of sensors to expand the sector of surveillance, to provide security to observers, and to cover dead space. When covering a point target, 360-degree coverage is ideal but not necessary if the critical node can be observed from one site. All-around coverage may require the use of multiple sites, which may require the ODA to be augmented with additional personnel. However, when more personnel are involved in surveillance, the chance of mission compromise is greater. Surveillance should be continuous once established; however, it may not always be feasible.

CONFIRMATION OF THE SITUATION

A-56. Upon arriving at the target area, the ODA must conduct a preliminary reconnaissance to confirm the situation. The goal is to confirm the target's exact location and to ensure the maps used during planning were correct. In addition, confirmation is the basis for selecting the actual locations of the observation and surveillance sites. Other items of interest addressed at this time include indications of threat security patrols, population control measures, landing zone and drop zone locations, and best routes for movement in the area. Major changes to the situation may require revamping of the plan. If major changes to the coordinated plan are required, new information must be passed to supporting agencies through the ODA's higher headquarters.

CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT TECHNIQUES

A-57. Concealment from observation is one of the main conditions for successful reconnaissance. If fixed site construction requires excavation, the principal problems are observer concealment during construction, removal of dirt, camouflage of leftover dirt, camouflage of the site during construction, and waste removal.

OBSERVER CONCEALMENT

A-58. In almost every case, an observation site is constructed at night, which affords significant concealment of activities. The first stage of construction is the erection of an earth tone Hessian net or other camouflage screen to work behind. Workers should not rise above the screen. This net or screen is secured to local cover with bungee cords or 550 cord. The observer then emplaces a poncho or other cover on which a precut camouflage net is attached, which is then erected as overhead cover. No branches are broken, and no other marks are left on the local vegetation.

REMOVAL OF DIRT

A-59. The observer carefully outlines the dimensions of the excavation and removes the topsoil and vegetation to a poncho or other material, which can be used to camouflage the site. Excess dirt should be transported from the site in anything that can be used as a container, such as sandbags and empty rucksacks. In an underground site, the Soldier places most of the excavated dirt back on top.

CAMOUFLAGE OF LEFTOVER DIRT

A-60. During construction, the observer removes leftover dirt so that it will not attract the attention of threat forces and so it can easily be retrieved when the excavation is being filled in. One method of hiding the dirt is to scrape the surface underneath brush, spread the fill, and then cover it with the scrapings (to present as natural an appearance as possible). Another method is to look for a natural depression, remove the top cover, fill in the depression with the dirt, and replace the top cover. During heavy rains, when runoff naturally stains surface waters, dirt can also be dumped into streams and other waterways.

CAMOUFLAGE OF THE OBSERVATION SITE DURING CONSTRUCTION

A-61. The observer constructs an observation site, maintaining camouflage discipline. The observer works diligently to minimize exposure to the threat. Disruption of the surrounding terrain is minimal. Dirt and topsoil that was placed on ponchos or plastic sheeting for camouflage of the site is used. Observers maintain individual camouflage to the extent possible (for example, by donning ghillie suits during construction). Personnel use natural vegetation or other camouflage to conceal the already completed parts of the site. They continue to camouflage the site to the greatest extent possible until they complete it.

WASTE REMOVAL

A-62. For health and security reasons, the observer maintains a high state of personal hygiene while on surveillance operations. Human waste, in particular, presents a problem. Dirt can be retained from excavations to fill over in layers the human waste deposited in the excavations. Commercial disposable biowaste disposal bags can be procured and used in the hide and surveillance sites as an effective and efficient means of reducing movement signature related to exiting the site for personal relief. As an expedient measure, waste can be deposited in zip-locked plastic bags; meal, ready-to-eat bags; and trash bags that are afterward sealed. Lime, baking soda, or formaldehyde may be used to minimize odor. Before leaving, all waste is removed or buried so that it is not detected by personnel or dug up by animals.

SURVEILLANCE SITE SELECTION

A-63. Surveillance sites are used for observation and monitoring. They are a vantage point from which visual, audible, olfactory, and electronic data on a target is collected. Selection of the sites is based on METT-TC, but several general planning considerations apply. The sites—

- Afford adequate visual and electronic line-of-sight target observation and security.
- Have as wide a field of view and as little dead space as possible.
- Are not near natural lines of drift or in terrain that would naturally draw the attention of threat forces, such as atop a flat rock face on a hill.
- Have covered and concealed exit and entry points.
- Are far enough downwind from the target and inhabited areas to minimize the olfactory detection of the site by dogs or people. Wind direction often changes at various times of the day.
- Are as close or distant to the target as mission and security considerations dictate.
- Have good overhead and side cover and concealment.
- Allow for the ability to conduct "break contact" battle drills.
- Afford reliable communications between the observers, their security element, and their ODA.
- Are, above all, in a location that is not obvious to threat forces.

A-64. If all these features cannot be found in a single site (daytime versus nighttime requirements), separate sites suited to the type of surveillance performed may be necessary. Multiple sites are mutually supporting; if one site is compromised, members of the other site are able to continue the surveillance mission and warn the rest of the ODA. Further, if the sites are not being used during the day, they should be kept under observation. If the sites cannot be secured by observation, they should not be reused the following night. This practice prevents the ODA from walking into an ambush while trying to reoccupy the position. The ODA avoids establishing patterns and trails while moving to and from the different sites. The ODA selects alternate locations for its sites if the primary site selected, based on map reconnaissance, proves unsuitable.

SURVEILLANCE SITE CONSTRUCTION

A-65. Surveillance sites can be surface, underground, or elevated. The ODA designs these sites for a specific purpose, mission, or target. The primary rule for building the site is that construction must be done during darkness, and the site must be occupied before sunrise. However, occupation before sunrise may not be practical based on METT-TC. An overt site in a permissive environment could very well be built in daylight, or a complex site may require more than one night to build. Other planning factors, such as illumination and current weather conditions, also play a major role in construction and occupation of a fixed site. When all factors are considered and the final location of the site is selected, the priority of work becomes the external features of the site. After occupation of the site, the ODA can improve internal features. While planning the construction of the site, the ODA should consider that everything used for the site must be removed or replaced, so that the terrain is returned to its natural state. The ODA keeps threat forces from gaining information about the extent of the operation, the possible target location, and the fact that the ODA was in the area. Not enough can be said of the importance of site construction rehearsals under similar conditions to that of the target. When possible, the same type of soil, construction materials, and planned techniques are used for rehearsals. During rehearsals, fellow unit members try to compromise the ODA that has occupied the site. Weaknesses in construction or occupation plans will quickly become apparent during rehearsals.

TYPES OF OBSERVATION OR SURVEILLANCE SITES

A-66. When fixed sites are required for mission execution, METT-TC determine the extent of the construction. In all cases, camouflage and concealment, as well as light and noise discipline, are important considerations during the construction of observation or surveillance sites. The following paragraphs describe different types of commonly used surveillance sites.

Underground Sites

A-67. The safest type of observation site for the observer to use is the underground site. The complexity of design and the effort required to construct the site are the primary detractors. When using light equipment, such as shovels and entrenching tools, underground sites can only be constructed in loose soils. Soil type is a very important planning consideration that must not be overlooked during mission preparation. This technique, though effective, is extremely time consuming and a significant risk to compromise unless prepared in advance of a preplanned, stay-behind surveillance mission.

Spider Hole

A-68. A spider hole is similar to a fighting position with overhead cover. The dimensions are about .75 meters wide by 1.2 meters long by 1–1.5 meters deep. The observer can adjust the dimensions to meet specific needs. Normally, this one-person site is established on a line or ring to provide support and security (figure A-2).



Figure A-2. Spider hole observation site

Tent-Type Site

A-69. Larger than a spider hole, the tent-type site is constructed for more than one observer. Supports for the overhead cover are made from a variety of materials. Branches, aluminum conduit, parachute suspension line, or fiberglass rods all work well as a frame for the cover. A slight arch in the cover multiplies the available space on the inside. The observer avoids grossly breaking the ground plane with the site apex (figure A-3).



Figure A-3. Tent-type observation site

Bunker-Type Site

A-70. The bunker-type site requires extensive construction time and material to complete. The observer can construct the underground bunker-type site (figure A-4) using a prefabricated kit that includes the tools needed to excavate and cut local materials, such as trees and logs. The kit also contains plastic sheeting for waterproofing the roof, walls, and floor. The sheeting can also be used to reinforce loose soil in the site. Depending on the soil in the area, sandbags are often required to shore up the sides of the site. In addition, sandbags lessen the accumulation of condensation produced when plastic sheeting is used.



Figure A-4. Underground observation site plan

Aboveground Sites

A-71. Aboveground sites are the most common type of fixed observation and surveillance sites. The advantages of selecting an aboveground site are the ease and speed that the site can be selected and occupied and the simplicity of construction. The primary disadvantages of these types of sites are easy detection and little protection from small-arms fire compared to belowground sites.

Caves

A-72. Caves can provide the observer with a ready-made observation site. However, caves present special problems. First, caves attract attention. They are often shown on maps or are known to the local populace. Locals often use caves for shelter and sometimes for storage. Caves also attract animals that use them for shelter, such as bats, birds, snakes, and larger animals. The presence of these animals presents medical risks to ODA members. In addition, early warning devices may be activated and may attract the attention of local threat forces. The use of caves increases the chance of discovery and should be avoided in all but emergency situations.

Scrape

A-73. A scrape is the enlargement of a depression in the ground to allow one person to take up a position. Scrapes are hasty in nature and require little preparation. Often used during darkness, scrapes provide the observer with a position to better use optical devices. The observer removes as much of the signs of occupation as possible when the mission is complete. The area is obscured by brushing away matted grasses, displaced dirt, and footprints. Overhead cover, such as a poncho, provides limited protection from the elements (figure A-5, page A-16).



Figure A-5. Scrape plan example

Vertical or Diagonal Scrape

A-74. A vertical or diagonal scrape is formed when the SR team makes use of a natural depression on the side of a sloping hill or other suitable topographic formation (figure A-6). This technique is less labor-intensive and uses natural topographic relief to conceal the SR team, thus requiring minimal prefabricated camouflage as overhead cover. The vertical hide can be constructed on the side of a suitably steep hill, in a naturally occurring trough, or in the midst of large rocks or boulders. A section of camouflage netting interlaced with natural, local vegetation can be used in areas with sufficient vegetation. In areas without abundant vegetation, commercially produced desert camouflage cloth, similar to a sniper veil, will generally be sufficient. When using existing terrain, excavation is usually not necessary, unless the hide is required to support a large number of personnel. Hides of this nature are exceedingly difficult to discern from a distance provided the SR team maintains good noise, light, and movement discipline.



Figure A-6. Vertical scrape observation site

CONSTRUCTION TECHNIQUES

A-75. Several construction techniques are common to all observation and surveillance sites. These techniques are included in standard operating procedures and practiced during normal training.

Dirt Removal

A-76. The primary problem in constructing any site is the removal of excess dirt. Excavated soil expands in volume. In dry climates, the subsurface soil contains the most water. This water content causes the soil to be a different color. This soil must be camouflaged. The ODA constructs underground sites before the early morning dew develops. Discarding excess soil before the dew sets in aids in the camouflage process. The ODA must also consider the effect of the sun drying out the excess soil. This dried soil may need to be re-camouflaged. The technique for camouflaging soil involves the use of plastic sheeting or a poncho as follows:

- Lay out the sheeting alongside the site position.
- Place the topsoil to one side of the sheeting. Remember that the topsoil only extends a few centimeters below the surface. Save as much of the vegetation as possible.
- Dig out the remaining soil. Do not mix the topsoil with subsoil from the hole.
- Fill sandbags with the loose soil dug from the hole and use them to reinforce the sides of the site.
- Fill surrounding depressions, ruts, or ditches with the remaining excess soil. If this is not possible, spread the soil lightly on the surface in an area away from the site. Avoid putting the excess soil in creeks or streams that may wash the dirt down the waterway and attract unwanted attention.
- After the overhead cover is constructed and waterproofed, replace the topsoil. Place vegetation, leaves, deadfall, or other local materials about the area to complete the camouflage of the site.
- Recover the sheeting used to contain the soil. Check the vegetation under the sheeting to ensure it was not matted down under the weight of the soil. If matting has occurred, take the time to brush it with a branch so that it appears to be in its natural state.
- As time passes, check the vegetation and soil around the site to ensure they appear natural. Loose soil often falls through small holes and results in a strange-looking, funnel-shaped hole. Check vegetation to ensure it blends with the surrounding area. Remove or replace dead vegetation.

Vegetation

A-77. When applying the B in the BLUES memory aid to the SR site, vegetation is critical. Replanting and watering vegetation during initial site construction can eliminate the need to replace wilted plants.

Grasses

A-78. When removing topsoil, the ODA member saves the grass. The ODA member removes the grass in clumps by cutting a circle about 5 to 15 centimeters around the section to be saved with an entrenching tool or shovel, then pries the roots and soil up from the bottom. When replacing the grass around the site, the member patterns the placement after the natural design. The ODA member shakes the grass slightly to loosen the roots and then replaces it at ground level. If water is available, a small amount placed on the grass lessens the shock of replanting and extends the life of the camouflage.

Plants and Bushes

A-79. Medium-sized plants or bushes will aid the security of the site. Not only will the plants add to the camouflage of the site, but they will also discourage vehicle and foot movements over the top of the site. The main disadvantage to using plants on top of the site is that the plants may die or fall over because of the shallow depth of the overhead cover. In addition, if close-quarters battle develops between a member of the ODA moving outside the site and a threat element, the threat may take cover behind the plant and thus discover the actual location of the site.

Deadfall

A-80. Deadfall can restrict movement in much the same way as the plants and bushes described above. However, the use of deadfall as part of the overall camouflage effort presents several disadvantages. The main disadvantage is that in most regions of the world deadfall is used for home heating, cooking, and construction. If the site has this fuel near it, the risk of discovery is increased. ODA members have limited options available to them if discovered by a non-hostile civilian: emergency exfiltration or activation of the evasion and recovery plan. Either course of action will result in the termination of the mission. Cover from small-arms fire is very limited when using deadfall. Most trees rot quickly when on the ground. Modern small-arms fire will easily pass through these rotten trees. For this reason, the ODA avoids using deadfall for cover. If ODA members must use it, they reinforce it with dirt.

Sidewall Support

A-81. Depending on the soil condition in the area of operations, the sidewall of the site may require some type of shoring or support to prevent a cave-in. The ODA can use a variety of material for supporting walls including timber, branches, deadfall, plastic sheeting, and ponchos. However, the primary means for supporting the sides is the use of sandbags. These lightweight bags serve a variety of uses and conform to almost any shape required. The exact number of bags required depends on the size and overall design of the site. The ODA determines this variable by practicing the construction of the proposed site. After the ODA has tested the design and determined the number of required bags, a 10 percent overage is added to the packing list. The few extra bags add flexibility for unforeseen factors such as damaged bags. The ODA also use the bags for transportation purposes. When cross bracing sandbagged walls, the ODA must use freshly cut green timber or something prefabricated such as polyvinyl chloride pipe or conduit. TM 3-34.85 provides examples of cross bracing and revetments.

COMMUNICATIONS SITE

A-82. Like the observation and surveillance site, the communications site (figure A-7) can be a fixed position or part of a patrol. If the communications site is to be a fixed position, the ODA may select and construct it in the same basic fashion as it does an observation and surveillance site. This site provides high frequency, satellite, and other types of communications between the ODA and its special operations task force. Conducting SR communications between the ODA and its supporting special operations task force is critical. ODAs are required to pass timely information to the special operations task force and to receive instructions and information. Communications between the communications site and outlying sites may be by buried wire, low-power frequency modulation radios with directional antennas, or messenger. Based on METT-TC, a communications site is routinely separate from all other sites for technical and security reasons. The advantages of separate communications sites are a reduction in the risk of detection through radio direction finding and in the number of personnel at any one location. The disadvantage of using messengers between separate communications sites is the increased risk of threat forces detecting the movement.



Figure A-7. Communications site

SURVEILLANCE SITE OCCUPATION

A-83. Occupation of the surveillance site is the same as occupation of a patrol base. The main difference is that the main body of the ODA may not occupy the site. Part of the element may remain in the ORP or MSS and establish communications, cover the route taken into the ORP, or gather the local material needed to construct the site. The primary or first shift of observers moves to the selected site only after the ODA leader has established security. After an appropriate listening halt has detected no activity in the area, ODA members may begin work on the site. After the construction is complete, all ODA members should know the exact location of the site, routes to and from the site, and time of shift changes. Before the ODA leader returns to the ORP, the completed site is observed from the threat side to ensure the site is completely camouflaged. The ODA leader then obscures all signs of occupation as the security element returns to the ORP.

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Appendix B

Surveillance Techniques

According to JP 3-0, *surveillance* is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means.

ROUTINE OBSERVATION

B-1. Observation is the acquisition of facts and the recording of specific information pertaining to the perception of details regarding persons, objects, places, and events. The purpose of observation is to gather facts and provide information for a specific intent. There are four elements for accurate observation. They are awareness, understanding, recording, and response. Each of these may be considered as a separate process or as occurring simultaneously.

AWARENESS

B-2. Awareness is the process of being consciously attuned to a particular fact. A trained observer should be aware of their surroundings at all times. The trained observer must take into account the various elements that influence and distort awareness.

UNDERSTANDING

B-3. Understanding enhances the observer's knowledge of what should be observed, broadens their ability to observe, and aids in evaluating information. Understanding is derived from education, training, and experience.

RECORDING

B-4. Recording is the ability to save and recall what is observed. Trained observers will have mechanical aids such as writing utensils, log books, and electronic devices such as cameras to support the recording of events. What is more important is the observer's ability to record, retain, and recall information accurately. The trained observer's retention depends on mental capacity, alertness, and the observer's ability to recognize what is essential or necessary to record. Additional factors that affect recording include:

- The amount of training and practice in observation.
- The observer's proficiency in observation skills through experience.
- The similarity of previous events.
- The observer's written and oral interpersonal communication skills.

RESPONSE

B-5. Response is the observer's action toward the information gathered. It may be as simple as filling in a logbook, making communication with higher headquarters, or making well-aimed precision fires.

UNDERSTANDING BASELINE

B-6. A baseline is a basis for comparison: a reference point against which other things can be evaluated. An understanding of baseline will assist an observer or teams in detecting threat indicators and other items of importance that may or may not be partially concealed during the observation and surveillance process.

B-7. A baseline is anything as it is in its natural state. Everything has a baseline. A culture, a neighborhood, and a portion of an environment has a baseline. Sound, odors, colors, and textures all have baselines. A trained observer identifies a baseline of an area over a period of time by observation and surveillance, or studying an area. The trained observer monitors baseline closely and is looking for items, individuals, and actions or events that stand out or are not normal to this baseline because disturbances are possible threat indicators.

INCIDENTAL INFORMATION COLLECTION

B-8. In addition to conducting SR as an assigned mission, SF Soldiers will collect information incidental to all other activities. Incidental information collection is an inherent responsibility, as opposed to a tasking. SF Soldiers often have unique, direct or indirect access (and are often the only U.S. military with access) to critical military, political, and economic infrastructure and potential joint special operations areas as a result of their extensive travels to areas of actual or potential interest to the United States.

B-9. SF Soldiers are obligated to note and promptly report all such unique or unusual information that comes to their attention. Incidental information collection is passive and overt. Incidental information is collected during normal ODA activities when they have access to certain areas. ODA members have training which enables them to recognize things of importance. An example of incidental information collection is an after action report or trip report that notes new phone numbers or new personnel who are vital to operations.

B-10. The United States, as well as the local combatant commanders, can use incidental information to establish and maintain strategic information superiority. Commanders should be aware of the coefficient relationship between informational and operational objectives and impress this relationship upon their subordinates. Every opportunity should be taken to exploit all available information collected during the conduct of tactical activities in order to support operational and strategic objectives. Recent and future conflicts have and will occur in an environment of real-time communication. This communications environment ensures that information reaches a global audience in a very short time and that individual actions can have immediate strategic implications. SF elements conducting SR operations should maintain situational awareness beyond the directed objective, not only for security purposes, but also in order to potentially collect any action or incident that may contribute to the parallel objective of information superiority. Reconnaissance is an integral part of intelligence operations. During SR missions, the successful observation, collection, and reporting of information requirements and priority intelligence requirements contribute to information superiority.

SEARCHING AND SCANNING

B-11. When moving into a new area, observers quickly scan the area for enemy activity that may be of immediate danger. This very rapid scan lasts about 30 seconds and is known as the self-preservation search method.

HASTY SEARCH

B-12. This is a rapid search of the surroundings conducted by the observer or collectively by a team of observers. Hasty searches should be periodically conducted during all operations. The first hasty search conducted during an operation should happen after an observer occupies a hide site position.

DETAILED SEARCH

B-13. Provided the observer fails to locate any immediate threats during the hasty search, they will then begin a systematic and deliberate examination known as a detailed search.

- **Search near to far.** The search should begin with terrain nearest to the observer's position because it normally presents the greatest danger.
- **Start at a near flank.** A detailed search should start at a point about 50 meters to either flank. The observer scans in a 180-degree arc searching everything in exacting detail.
- **Overlapping scans.** When the opposite flank is reached, scan back across the front making sure this new scan slightly overlaps the last by about 10 meters.
- **Completely cover the area of responsibility.** Continue making overlapping strips until the far limits of the field of observation or observer's area of responsibility is reached. This method of observation is called the 50-meter overlapping strip search method.

VIEWING TECHNIQUES

B-14. When viewing from urban and rural buildings, the observer avoids windows and door openings that attract the attention of threat observers and snipers. Depending on the situation, a wide variety of viewing techniques may be used against an urban target.

WINDOW VIEWING

B-15. When a window (opening) is being used for viewing a target, the observer lowers the risk of compromise by erecting a flat black background screen a couple of feet inside the window and wearing the same flat black clothing. If the screen is properly erected, the observer must remain still to blend in with the normal shadow inside the window. This technique works better in a window with glass. Where the site is overt, as in some counterinsurgency operations, the viewing ports can be covered with black Hessian screen to allow movement and observation without giving a sniper a clear target. Covering viewing ports with screens lowers the vulnerability to grenade attacks. To avoid grenade attacks, observers use upper floors of the site.

ACOUSTIC AND LASER MONITORING

B-16. When someone on the other side of a pane of glass is targeted, observers can hear and record conversations with off-the-shelf directional sound amplification devices or laser eavesdroppers. In either case, the window acts as a modulator, vibrating in sync with the speech in the room. With sound amplification equipment, it is possible to retrieve audible sounds from the glass surface. With laser eavesdropping, a laser beam is reflected off the window to a receiver, which electronically converts the pulses made by the window to audible speech. Either technique may be defeated by thick curtains and recorded background chatter or music directed toward the window. These items are available to both friend and foe alike. Observers take countermeasures when talking or conducting meetings in a possible threat area. Simple steps hinder threat force monitoring, such as holding the conversations in a low voice.

FIXED SITE EQUIPMENT

B-17. An observer must have several items in the site: personal weapon, individual CBRNE protective equipment, optical instruments for observation, compass, watch, map, observation log, communications equipment, and all the food and water needed for the duration of the mission (unless resupply is feasible).

OBSERVATION SITE KITS

B-18. When possible, the ODA assembles prefabricated kits to aid in the construction of the required site. The ODA need not take the entire kit into the operational area. The team can assemble the kits as a stockpile. The ODA can draw upon the stockpile for mission-specific equipment during isolation. These kits include:

- Camouflage or ghillie nets to cover a scrape or depression site along with natural local vegetation.
- Parachute suspension line. This material can be interwoven to produce a frame for overhead cover.
- Sandbags.
- Assorted tapes, cords, and ropes.
- Plastic bags with zip-locks. These items can be used for general storage.
- Squares of 1-centimeter thick plywood that are a half meter on each side. This lightweight material is excellent for constructing overhead cover, platforms for use in trees, and insulation when operating on ice and snow. The squares are painted to match the terrain in which they will be used.
- Plastic sheeting. Heavy-gauge plastic sheeting fills many roles. If plastic sheeting is not available, the heavy-duty plastic bags used to cover pallets work well.
- Hand tools, such as D-handle shovels, hacksaws, hammers, small bow saws, and like items.
- Plastic or aluminum tent stakes. These items save time during construction of the site.
- Canvas and camouflage netting.
- Commercial human waste disposal bags or lime, formaldehyde, or cat litter and baking soda for field-expedient waste disposal.
- Mirrors or periscopes.

B-19. The principal documents are a diagram of reference points and the observation log. The diagram of reference points is similar to a range card and DA Form 5517 (*Standard Range Card*) available on https://armypubs.army.mil can be adapted to this purpose. An SF shooter's log found in TC 18-32 provides a patrol log that can be adapted for maintaining an observation log. Figure B-1 is an example of a diagram of reference points. On the diagram, observers may depict reference points by sketching the corresponding terrain features.



Figure B-1. Example of reference points diagram

B-20. Other terrain features (for example, hills, woods, and rivers) are shown by conventional topographic symbols, whereas the point of observation is shown by a tactical symbol. FM 1-02.2 provides additional information on symbols. The observation log is a written record of what was observed, where it was observed, and when the observation took place. The ODA member uses this log in conjunction with other observer notes, sketches, and photographs.

REMOTE SENSORS

B-21. Sensors serve a vital purpose in maintaining operational area security and should not be overlooked when conducting mission planning. The sensors in use today collect information by using seismic, infrared, long-range infrared, acoustic, and magnetic means. Sensors used today are also able to tag, track, and locate personnel or equipment; however, planners must balance the use of sensors against mission security requirements and the established acceptable risk of compromise. The use of sensors will require the detachment to remain exposed in an area significantly longer than they would when conducting most other SR missions. Emplacing and maintaining sensors for an extended duration will significantly increase the risk of detection or compromise.

B-22. The ODA can use remote sensors to perform such tasks as perimeter defense, surveillance, environmental monitoring (including radiological, nuclear, and early warning), and target acquisition. Remote sensors are not a military intelligence collection asset. However, they do provide information that the joint special operations task force uses to cue other military intelligence collection assets to activity. The ODA should consider remote sensors when preparing the information collection plan. Soldiers can hand-emplace them either inside or outside buildings or structures. Their optimal employment is in areas where major movement is restricted to a few key LOCs and the traffic pattern of military and civilian activity can

be easily discriminated. Remote sensor missions are ideally suited to support relatively stable situations, such as long-term defensive or security operations, where the time and resources are available to develop an extensive sensor network throughout the area of operations. The employment of sensors in open terrain or heavily congested urban concentrations requires detailed planning to ensure the sensor network can provide the desired information in those environments.

B-23. When the observer spots an item of interest that requires a closer look, higher-powered visual augmentation systems (VAS) with an optic of higher magnification are used. This allows the observer to positively identify someone or acquire a more detailed understanding of an item of interest. Observers using a spotting scope or other higher-powered VAS before spotting an item of interest leads to extreme eye fatigue due to the higher magnification and may lead to threats not being detected due to the difficulty of scanning with a smaller field of view.

ORGANIZATION OF SURVEILLANCE SECTORS

B-24. The ODA leader ensures the entire sector is covered. Reporting procedures are reviewed with the observer prior to occupation of the observation site. The ODA leader also ensures stable and reliable communications means exist between the observation site and the communications site, patrol base, or main body. In the observation site, observation is conducted according to a given sequence.

B-25. The observer's sector is divided into near, far, and middle zones designated by arbitrary lines based on terrain features, illumination, and reference points. The near zone includes the terrain area within which small targets can be seen with the naked eye. The middle zone is the terrain in which prominent terrain features are within the limits of visibility. The far zone takes in the rest of the expanse to the limits of visibility with optical instruments. At the same time that the observation sector is divided into zones, dead ground (unobservable sectors of terrain) is determined and given special attention since the threat force can use these sectors as concealed approaches.

B-26. As a rule, the observer first inspects the terrain with the naked eye and then inspects those areas in which threat targets may be positioned using optical instruments. To alleviate the potential for eye fatigue, observation is conducted by alternating instrument use and observation with the naked eye.

B-27. The observer looks for indicators, spots threat targets and activities, and determines their locations. The observer records positions of targets in relation to known reference points. If possible, the observer notes the estimated coordinates of the targets. Range-finding instruments and a compass are used to pinpoint target locations through modified resection.

B-28. During execution of the surveillance mission, the observer will need to be relieved. At the time of relief, the current observer informs the reliever of the updated situational information. The relieving observer is shown the observation sector on the terrain and other objects for special attention. The relieving observer is also given the reference points, targets discovered, disposition of any friendly units in the area, and location and nature of threat activity in the area. The current observer returns to the MSS or ORP and reports to the ODA leader.

Note: Observation of the target must not be interrupted while the observers are changing shifts.

NIGHT OBSERVATION

B-29. Darkness limits visibility, changes the outlines of objects, and distorts perceptions of distance. Dark objects seem farther away, whereas light ones seem closer. Therefore, orientation on the terrain and the detection and identification of objects are more difficult at night than during the day. Night observation is conducted with the naked eye and, for particular applications, night vision devices.

B-30. The ODA leader plans and organizes night observation during the daylight period before the onset of darkness. The ODA leader verifies the location of observation sites and the readiness of the observers for night work. Thermal devices can be invaluable at night. They must be properly used because they heat up and need to be shut down periodically to cool. The ODA members practice thermal countermeasures to avoid detection in the event that the enemy has night vision devices. The ODA often conducts military operations during the hours of darkness. The following paragraphs describe night observation techniques.

DARK ADAPTATION

B-31. The exposure to light directly affects night vision. Repeated exposure to bright sunlight has an increasingly adverse effect on dark adaptation. Exposure to intense sunlight for 2 to 5 hours causes a definite decrease in visual sensitivity, which can persist for as long as 5 hours. This effect can be intensified by reflective surfaces, such as sand and snow. At the same time, the rate of dark adaptation and degree of night vision capability are decreased. Since these effects are cumulative and may persist for several days, Soldiers should use military neutral-density sunglasses or filtered lenses in bright sunlight when night operations are anticipated.

NIGHT VISION SCANNING

B-32. Dark adaptation or night vision is only the first step toward maximizing the ability to see at night. Night vision scanning can enable the observer to overcome many physiological vision limitations. Night vision scanning can also reduce the visual illusions that often confuse the observers. The technique involves scanning from right to left or left to right using a slow, regular scanning movement (figure B-2). Although both day and night searches use scanning movements, observers at night should avoid looking directly at a faintly visible object when trying to confirm its presence.



Figure B-2. Night vision scanning

OFF-CENTER VISION

B-33. Peripheral vision can aid in trying to identify outlines or slight movements. During night observations, an extremely effective technique for detecting outlines is the focusing of attention on an object without looking directly at it. Viewing an object using central vision during daylight poses no limitation but is ineffective at night. Limited night vision is caused by the night blind spot that exists during periods of low illumination. ODA members use off-center vision to compensate for this limitation. The observer views an object by looking 10 degrees above, below, or to either side of it, rather than directly at the object. This procedure allows the peripheral vision to maintain contact with an object (figure B-3).



Figure B-3. Off-center vision

COUNTERING BLEACH-OUT EFFECT

B-34. Even when off-center viewing is practiced, the image of an object viewed longer than 2 or 3 seconds tends to bleach out and become one solid tone. As a result, the object is no longer visible and can produce a potentially unsafe operating condition. To overcome this limitation, the observer should be aware of the phenomenon and avoid looking at an object longer than 2 or 3 seconds. By shifting the eyes from one off-center point to another, the observer can continue to pick up the object in the peripheral field of vision.

SHAPE OR SILHOUETTE

B-35. The ability to discern objects visually is significantly reduced at night; consequently, the observer must identify objects by their shape or silhouette. Observers must become familiar with the architectural design of structures, vehicles, equipment, and like objects common to the area of operations to maximize information collection. The observer's success using this technique comes from extensive drilling and practice.

NIGHT VISION DEVICES

B-36. The observer should use electronic night vision devices for special applications and not for routine observation because of their harmful effect on night vision. Observers should scan with night vision devices only for a few moments and use the same pattern as for scanning with the naked eye. To avoid detection, night vision devices are used in the passive mode in all but the most extreme cases.

LIGHT SOURCES AND DISTANCES

B-37. During periods of limited visibility, an observer should be cognizant of the types and ranges of different light sources. Table B-1 lists typical light sources and the distances they are visible to the naked eye in clear, cool air.

Table B-1. Light sources and distances of visibility in clear, cool air

Source	Distance in Kilometers (km)
Vehicle headlights	4–8
Muzzle flashes from single cannons	4–5
Muzzle flashes from small arms	1.5–2
Bonfire	6–8
Flashlights (white light)	1.5–2
Lighted match	Up to 1.5
Lighted cigarette	.5–.8
Note: For observation from elevated positions in the air, these distances are increased by a factor of 2 or 3.	

VULNERABILITIES TO DETECTION

B-38. Fixed sites are vulnerable to a wide range of compromising factors. Compromise generally results from poor light, noise, and smell discipline; poor site selection, faulty camouflage, or sometimes by effective search patterns on the part of the threat force. Most compromises because of these factors occur—

- When an infiltration platform is observed.
- During movement to the target area.
- When the site is being set up, occupied, or observers are changing shifts.
- Where the vision slit appears as a dark horizontal strip in some terrain feature.
- Where a dark spot occurs in a tree against a background of surrounding trees.
- When light reflects from the glass of optical instruments.
- When threat forces notice changes in the shape or color of terrain features and vegetation.
- When threat forces detect small groups of people appearing at approximately the same time and place (for relief of observers, the serving of food, and the like).
- When a source of infrared radiation, thermal radiation, or electronic emission is detected.
- Where there is an absence of frost or snow on certain tree branches during the winter.
- When a tree moves in still air or nervousness on the part of birds and other animals in the area.
- Where a wisp of smoke or steam appears from the heating of a fixed site during cold weather.

DEPARTURE

B-39. When departing the site, the ODA leaves quickly and quietly. ODA members thoroughly remove all equipment, notebooks, trash, and like items. Ponchos and camouflage netting are packed, and if practicable, excavations are filled in. If the ODA can fill in the excavation, it carefully replaces the original topsoil and vegetation that it had preserved on the site. Tracks are covered, and the site is left in as close to its original condition as possible. If the ODA does not do these things and threat forces subsequently discover the site, the ODA's presence will have been compromised. Knowing the location of the site may permit threat forces to surmise what information was gathered. This compromise, in turn, may inhibit subsequent surveillance operations against the target. When departing the site, as a countertracking and security means, the ODA should not move directly to its ORP or patrol base. ODA members should make frequent listening halts enroute to these locations, taking advantage of cover and concealment and making several changes in direction during movement.

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Appendix C

Information Reporting

Reporting information in an efficient manner is a critical skill for any R&S effort. Information reporting becomes even more critical during crisis action or time sensitive planning. There are several techniques to convey complex information to the user. Although digital images are extremely valuable, they often do not provide enough detail about the captured image. Sometimes an observer can see things that cannot be captured in a photograph or that may need further clarification. There may also be times when the use of digital transmission is untimely compared to verbal reporting. The following techniques are intended to enable individuals to transmit information with or without supplemental digital images and to enhance their ability to convey the critical information in an accurate and timely manner.

REPORTING FORMAT

C-1. Reporting formats should be in accordance with formats established by unit standard operating procedure or formats established during mission analysis and planning. The memory aid SALUTE is the basis for a simple report format example. SALUTE stands for the following:

- **S—Size.** The size of the element observed.
- **A—Activity.** The activities conducted by the observed personnel or vehicles/equipment.
- **L—Location.** The exact location of the observed personnel/activity (and the direction of travel).
- **U—Unit.** Because of the difficulty in ascertaining the unit designation of those observed, the identifying marking on personnel and equipment suffice.
- **T—Time and Date.** The time and date of initial observation and the duration of activity.
- **E—Equipment.** Detailed information in reference to uniforms, individual equipment, weapons, vehicles, and so on. This information is important in the determination of enemy unit identification, as well as intent.

C-2. The reconnaissance element should infiltrate with baseline specific information requirements. Asking "What would they ask?" is a good start, but the reconnaissance element should be provided updated information requirements during the operation. Providing too much information is better than not enough. The reconnaissance element's job is to provide information to the commander or to the force that may action that target. Higher headquarters can filter and decide what information is important.

C-3. To send the most detailed information that time will allow, the observer should collect as much information as possible and review the message to be sent prior to transmission. Team members should ask themselves, "What questions would they ask if they were to receive this report?" and then fill in those gaps in information. Including the necessary available information at the first opportunity could potentially eliminate the requirement for a fragmentary order issued to the team or even follow-on reconnaissance missions designed to obtain information that the observer omitted.

GRID REPORTING SYSTEM

C-4. By using a standardized grid system and standardized formats and templates, ODA members can relay information gained through reconnaissance by voice or data transmission quickly. This method can be used for an orientation of an objective area called a *grid overhead sector sketch* and for a description of specific structures called a *grid structure sketch*. Although this system is used extensively by units operating in urban environments, it is a valuable technique in any environment for reporting the approximate dimensions of structures and the relative proximity of several colocated structures.

C-5. To create the generic grid, vertical lines are labeled left to right using a double-number system starting with 00, 01, and so on. Horizontal lines are labeled from bottom to top using a double-letter system starting with AA. Figure C-1 provides a sample of a generic grid.



Figure C-1. Sample generic grid

GRID OVERHEAD SECTOR SKETCH

C-6. If overhead imagery is available and sufficient, an initial sketch can be made directly on the imagery prior to the insertion of the ground observation elements. If the information is unavailable, a grid overhead sector sketch can be created on the ground for a given objective. Any terrain or manufactured structures or obstacles that will affect the situation should be included. If a generic sketch is developed beforehand, ground observation elements confirm its accuracy and submit any changes as soon as possible. The sketch should include the location of the observation elements. Other information can be included on the sketch depending on the requirements of the force using the information. Examples of additional information include—

- Breach points (potential or recommended).
- Helicopter insertion points for insertion directly onto the objective.
- Hazards to insertion such as power lines or guard towers.
- Routes to last covered and concealed position for an assault force if insertion is away from the objective.
- Linkup points between observation elements and follow-on assault forces.
- External lighting and security.
- Wires and obstacles.
- Entry points.
- Security positions and weapons orientation.

C-7. To prevent confusion, the observer uses numbers when referring to buildings or structures according to a standardized procedure. The observer also uses standardized procedures when referencing the sides of a structure. The sides of structures can be referred to by cardinal directions (north, south, east, or west), or code words can be established to refer to the front, back, left side, right side, and roof or topside of structures. In the latter case, right and left sides are relative to the front side of the structure, which is determined by the main entrance. Different circumstances favor different techniques. Situations that have clear and complete information favor code words for sides; however, the less complete the information is on a structure, the more likely individuals will confuse which side is the front or right. If cardinal directions are used, individuals need to make an effort to maintain orientation.

C-8. The grid overhead sector sketch can be sent line by line using a brevity code format, or a digital photo can be taken of the sketch, and it can be transmitted electronically. Figure C-2 is an example of a grid overhead sector sketch.



Figure C-2. Example grid overhead sector sketch

GRID STRUCTURE SKETCH

C-9. Observation elements need to capture as much information as possible from their vantage points. When compiled, the information collected from multiple positions covering the same objective from multiple sides begins to provide a detailed, three-dimensional description. To compile information from several observation elements, the observer uses standardized cataloging procedures. The observer labels all openings, starting from left to right and proceeding from top to bottom. The observer reports all window openings, even if they are blocked (air conditioners). Prior to beginning a sketch, the observer must determine the scale to convey the sketch data properly. The observer determines the scale based on common door sizes (usually 7 feet), weapons, vehicles, or building materials (8-foot panels or 2.25-inch standard brick height).

C-10. The observer should number buildings starting with the structure of greatest importance (numeral 1). Subsequent numbers can radiate out from the building labeled with the numeral 1 or continue in the order of precedence (figure C-3). Structures that are associated with each other are numbered accordingly to group them together (3, 3A, and 3B in figure C-4).



Figure C-3. Example of a structure sketch with a central building



Figure C-4. Example of small satellite buildings attached to a larger building

C-11. Once the scale is established, a rudimentary sketch can be quickly generated. If time is an issue, the initial sketch can be sent immediately. If there are no time constraints, the sketch can be refined using programs such as Microsoft PowerPoint. As with the grid overhead sector sketch, the observer can transmit information verbally using brevity codes (as text in a data transmission) or visually by sending digital images of a sketch.

VERBAL TRANSMISSION OF GRID STRUCTURAL SKETCH DATA

C-12. To transmit grid structural data, the observer begins by establishing a start point. The observer identifies a four-digit grid coordinate, read left to right, bottom to top. The height, width, and general configuration of the target is then determined. The number of squares is counted up to determine the height, and the number of squares is counted across to determine the width. Figure C-5 shows a sample of a 5 by 10 rectangular target. The observer will state the general configuration of the target as it is faced (square, rectangular, circular, L-shaped, and so on).



Figure C-5. Sample 5 by 10 rectangular target using start point 01AB

C-13. Once the grid structural data is outlined, the observer reports all openings. At a minimum, the observer sends the lower left and the upper right coordinates to report openings, such as doors or windows. For an arch door, arch window, or transom window, the observer identifies at least two points at the base and one point at the top of the arch. For circular windows, the observer identifies the center and the bottom. By using standard templates for common door and window types, the observer can relay information using numerical letters and numbers. Levels are depicted by using letters (A, B, C, etc.) starting from the upper level and working down. Figure C-6 provides an example of a grid structure sketch.



Figure C-6. Example grid structure sketch

C-14. After recording all openings, the observer determines the type of doors, windows, roof, and building materials. The standardized numerical categories correspond to figures C-7 through C-12, pages C-7 through C-11:

- The numeral 1 equals roof types.
- The numeral 2 equals doors.
- The numeral 3 equals windows.
- The numeral 4 equals construction materials.

C-15. Templates can further distinguish common types within a category by letter. The number and letter combination relays a specific category and the specific type within that template. Figure C-7 shows examples of different types of roofs.



Figure C-7. Examples of roof types

C-16. The observer distinguishes common types of doors and includes the type of material the door is made of (wood or metal), which way it opens, and the handle or knob location. Figure C-8 provides examples of different types and descriptions of doors.



Figure C-8. Examples of doors

C-18. Figure C-9 provides examples of different types of windows and the manner in which they open. This level of detailed information can give the follow-on ODA or unit a great advantage over the enemy. The information advantage aids in scenario rehearsals and planning (proper breaching material selection). Understanding the window location and how it opens could minimize confusion on the target. Scenario rehearsals can be developed according to the SF SR information received. Possessing this detailed information also gives the ODA or unit an advantage in knowing what kind of breaching tools to bring. In addition, this information could lead the follow-on unit to decide to enter the target building through a first floor door instead of trying to access one unbarricaded window on the third floor. Units should plan for all contingencies. However, having a base knowledge of the target aids in planning and rehearsals, which ultimately aids in execution of the target.



Figure C-9. Examples of windows

C-19. Wall construction information provides the follow-on ODA or unit with breaching information, as well as fields of fire. A target house built of cement block (instead of wood) gives the ODA or unit an idea of how much explosive it may need to pack to breach the target. Information stating the target building is wood aids the ODA or unit's understanding of potential risks inherent with attacking a wood building from opposing sides. Figure C-10 provides an example of a verbal report using the following parameters:

- Bravo 1, 02AC 05AF, 3B, break.
- Bravo 2, 08AA 11AF, 2D, knob right side, opens out, break.



An observer sends the lower-left and the upper-right coordinates to report openings.

Example of a verbal report for a window, using the following parameters:



Example of a verbal report for a door, using the following parameters:



Note: For an arch window, the observer identifies at least two points at the base and one point at the top of the arch.

Legend:

◉ structural point

Figure C-10. Example of a verbal report

C-20. Figure C-11 provides a sample template of wall construction materials.



Figure C-11. Wall construction materials

C-21. Figure C-12 provides an example of a report using the following parameters:

- "[Call sign], [date-time group], [message number or type], break."
- "Building 2, start point, 02AB, 7 by 18 rectangular, wall 4D, break."
- "Alpha 1, through alpha 3, break."
- "Alpha 1, 04AD 07AG, 3F, break."
- "Alpha 2, 09AB 12AG, 2E, knob left side, opens in, break."
- "Alpha 3, 14AD 18AG, 3D, break."
- "Roof, 05AL 18AL, 1F, break."
- "Scale, 1 foot, break."



Figure C-12. Example Report

C-22. Using brevity codes, the same report as paragraph C-21 is reported as follows:

- /[Call sign]/15 1200 message 01/#2 SP 02AB 7 by 18 W 5D/
- A1-A3/A1 04AD 07AG3F/A2 09AB 12AG 2E KLS OI/
- A3 14AD 18AG 3D/R 05AL 18AL 1F/S 1F/BT

Note: When the observer sends information as data, a slash "/" is used between sentences or objects, and a space is used within sentences or objects. When a message is sent in two or more parts, the observer states this after the message number.

C-23. Once the base sketches have been created, the observer reports all other critical information as appropriate to the situation. Possible essential elements of information include the following:

- Target location as an eight-digit grid (crisis site or center of mass).
- External security or patrols.
- External noncombatant traffic.
- Peak period of activity (combatant and noncombatant).
- Internal security or patrols.
- Automated security devices and sensors.
- External lighting.
- Dead space from lighting.
- Perimeter fencing and gates.
- Towers or bunkers.
- Surrounding area information, to include the following:
  - Observer positions.
  - Recommended linkup site.
  - Recommended last covered and concealed position.
  - Recommended approach route to the last covered and concealed position, and breach points.
  - Obstacles and danger areas.
  - Any indicators of mined areas or booby traps.
  - Helicopter landing zone hazards.
  - Terrain and vegetation.
  - Weather conditions, to include winds.
  - The presence of dogs or other animals.
  - Collateral damage considerations (proximity of noncombatants, potential for rotor wash damage, proximity of historical or religious facilities, or proximity of friendly forces).
  - Background noise, generators or air conditioners, and so on.
- Target description, to include the following:
  - Number of structures on the target.
  - Type of construction.
  - Number of visible floors.
  - Entrances and exits.
  - Type of doors and windows.
  - Obstacles on the roofs.
  - Obstacles in the immediate area.
  - Fire escapes, ladders, or external stairways.
- Utilities, to include the following:
  - Communications (phone lines and antennas).
  - Water (towers or wells, sewage and drainage).
  - Power (power lines and external generators).
  - Ventilation (air intake, exhaust, and filtration).

DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPHY

C-24. Imagery documented using tactical digital media facilitates operational analysis and planning. There are many capabilities and advantages of modern digital photography equipment, which include convenience (less bulky), instant retrieval of images, ability to transmit files, ability to edit images, and memory capacity (ability to take multiple images of a subject). However, there are some limitations such as adjusting shutter speeds and aperture, using more battery power, and sensitivity to heat, cold and moisture.

C-25. Digital still photography cameras capture images electronically. ODAs can store the images on an internal camera memory or removable memory device that can transfer information for viewing and printing immediately. ODA members can also use night vision devices on cameras as required. Night vision devices allow camera usage during darkness or other limited light conditions.

C-26. Good photography takes practice. ODA members need to develop and practice methods for capturing images in low light conditions or of fast-moving subjects. Generally, changing the aperture, the adjustable diaphragm in the lens, controls the amount of light entering the camera and controls the depth of field in conjunction with the lens. Controlling the shutter speed will allow for images to be rapidly recorded and given enough light can clearly depict a fast-moving subject in their movement.

C-27. ODAs will also need to consider how to conceal the equipment and prevent reflection off the lens to avoid detection, as well as techniques for utilizing cameras in both urban and rural environments. Photographing subjects from a distance requires large and long lenses relative to the average digital camera size. Adjustable and wide-angle lenses will allow the greatest flexibility when photographing in both indoor and outdoor environments. TC 18-20 provides more information on photography.

C-28. With some modifications, the observer can use digital imagery to replace or supplement a grid structure sketch. The observer sends the image as a Joint Photographic Experts Group (JPEG) image because it has a significantly reduced file size and transfer time. A plain-text message accompanies the photograph. This message includes a reference number so it can be associated with the proper photograph. If possible, data is included directly on the photograph (figure C-13, page C-14). The following information should be included:

- The photograph number. Photograph numbers are three-digit numbers starting with 001. This number will be used as the reference number for accompanying text messages.
- The number of the building. This will include the grid overhead sector sketch index, the side (in cardinal directions), and the number of the building.
- The azimuth and distance from which the photograph was taken.
- The date-time group.

Example of an observation report using the following parameters:

Number of Building from GOSS Index (if applicable)

Azimuth/ Distance

Date
Time
Time Zone
Month
Year

001 / 13AH , SOUTH, 05 / 235, 100m / 242002ZMAY15

Photo Number

Building Number and Side

DTG

Legend:

DTG	date-time group
GOSS	grid overhead sector sketch

Figure C-13. Example of a digital photograph

C-29. Photographs can be cropped to highlight a specific portion of interest but will still require specific explanations (figure C-14). What seems obvious to the observer can be lost in a stand-alone photograph.

C-30. Photographs captured in panoramic format cover large areas or structures (figure C-15). Any additional information critical to understanding the photograph may also be included.



Figure C-14. Example of a cropped photograph

Figure C-15. Example of a panoramic photograph

C-31. Individuals observed on or around an objective should be recorded and reported appropriately. The mnemonic SNAP (sex, nationality, age, and physical description) is used to outline the minimum reporting requirements for individuals on or around an objective. If the mission requires a more detailed compilation of information about individuals, the observer should note the following:

- Are they enemy, friendly, or unknowns?
- What are their approximate ages?
- What are their approximate weights?
- What are their builds (small, medium, stocky, or heavy)?
- What are their races (white, black, Latino, or other)?
- What color is their hair, or do they even have hair?
- Are they wearing headgear?
- How are they dressed (shirt, pants, shoes)?
- Are they carrying weapons? If so, what type?
- What are they doing?

ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE REPORT

C-32. Observers record information on the form available on https://www.esd.whs.mil/directives/forms for the terrain or structure such as DD Form 3010 (*Road Reconnaissance Report*) for roads. If forms are not available, the observer reports and records routes on existing maps, strip maps, or computer/GPS software using the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) coordinate grid system. All reports must be clear and easily understood. Reports, such as a route reconnaissance report, should be able to stand alone and be useable by an individual with little knowledge of the local area. Table C-1 shows two samples of a route reconnaissance report if forms are not available.

Table C-1. Sample airfield and terrain route reconnaissance report

Airfield Report Format	
Letter Designation	**Explanation**
A	Map sheet(s)
B	Date and time information was collected
C	Location (grid coordinates)
D	Number of runways (length and width)
E	Runway orientation
F	Runway surface type
G	Runway condition
H	Hangars and bulk-fuel storage facilities (condition)
I	Aircraft parking area
J	Maintenance facility
K	Road access
L	Any other information (type of aircraft using airfield)
Report airfields by serial number. The appropriate letter designation must precede each category of information.	

Terrain Report Format	
Letter Designation	**Explanation**
A	Map sheet(s) and grid coordinates
B	Ground shape (flat, rolling, hilly)
C	Cross-country movement
D	Vegetation
E	Concealment
F	Land use
G	Soil digging suitability
Report terrain by serial number. The appropriate letter designation must precede each category of information.	

C-33. Observers record information on ferries and bridges in DD Form 3014 (*Ferry Reconnaissance Report*) and DD Form 3011 (*Bridge Reconnaissance Report*) available on https://www.esd.whs.mil/directives/forms. Table C-2 shows two samples of a route reconnaissance report if forms are not available.

Table C-2. Sample ferry and bridge site route reconnaissance report

Ferry Site Report Format	
Letter Designation	**Explanation**
A	Map sheet(s)
B	Date and time information was collected
C	Location (grid coordinates)
D	Military load classification of approaches
E	Possibilities of concealment and cover
F	Width of water obstacle
G	Depth of water at banks and tidal formation
H	Stream velocity
I	Slope on bank approaches and bank conditions
J	Holding areas for road and water transport
K	Additional information (number of rafts available, work hours required to prepare, stream-crossing equipment)
Report ferries by serial number. The appropriate letter designation must precede each category of information.	

Bridge Site Report Format	
Letter Designation	**Explanation**
A	Map sheet(s)
B	Date and time information was collected
C	Location (grid coordinates)
D	Width of gap at bank seats
E	Width of gap at water level
F	Rise and fall of water level and change in wet gap width
G	Velocity of current
H	Nature of bottom
I	Height of near bank above water level
J	Height of far bank above water level
K	Safe bearing pressure of soil
L	Work required on near and far bank approaches
M	Possible local areas for concealing bridging equipment
Report bridges by serial number. The appropriate letter designation must precede each category of information.	

C-34. Observers record information on fords and tunnels in DD Form 3013 (*Ford Reconnaissance Report*) and DD Form 3012 (*Tunnel Reconnaissance Report*) available on https://www.esd.whs.mil/directives/forms. Table C-3 shows two samples of a route reconnaissance report if forms are not available.

Table C-3. Sample ford and tunnel route reconnaissance report

Ford Report Format	
Letter Designation	**Explanation**
A	Map sheet(s)
B	Date and time information was collected
C	Location (grid coordinates) and ford type
D	Minimum width
E	Maximum depth
F	Stream velocity
G	Type of bottom
H	Maximum percent of slope on bank exits
I	Military load classification
J	Other information
Report fords by serial number. The appropriate letter designation must precede each category of information.	

Tunnel Report Format	
Letter Designation	**Explanation**
A	Map sheet(s)
B	Date and time information was collected
C	Location (grid coordinates)
D	Length
E	Width

C-35. Observers record information on enemy or unidentified minefields in DD Form 3017 (*Explosive Hazards Survey Report*) available on https://www.esd.whs.mil/directives/forms. Table C-4 shows a sample of a route reconnaissance report if forms are not available.

Table C-4. Sample enemy or unidentified minefield route reconnaissance report

Enemy Minefield and/or Unidentified Minefield Not Laid by Reporting Unit Report	
Letter Designation	**Explanation**
A	Map sheet(s)
B	Date and time information was collected
C	Type of minefield (antitank, antipersonnel, or mixed)
D	Grid references or minefield extremities, if known
E	Depth of minefield
F	Enemy weapons or surveillance bearing on the minefield, if any
G	Estimated time required to clear minefield
H	Estimated material and equipment required to clear minefield
I	Routes for bypassing the minefield, if any
J–Y	Grid references of lanes (entry and exit) and width of lanes in meters
Z	Any other information (types of mines used, new mines, types of booby traps)

Source Notes

This section lists sources by page number.

C-11 Figure C-11. Wall construction materials.
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C-14 Figure C-13. Example of a digital photograph. License: Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike-4.0 via Wikimedia Commons. Title: *Žilina, Safety Match Factory From 1914/1915*. Author: Juloml. Available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Zilina_zapalkaren.jpg.

C-15 Figure C-14. Example of a cropped photograph. License: Creative Commons Attribution-2.0 via Flickr. Title: *Courtyard of the Great Mosque, Kairouan*. Author: benfound. Available at https://www.flickr.com/photos/73966711@N00/4085603773.

C-15 Figure C-15. Example of a panoramic photograph. License: Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons. Title: *Campnoupano2011*. Author: Jack Pollock. Available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Campnoupano2011.jpg.

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Glossary

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADP	Army doctrine publication
ATP	Army techniques publication
BLUES	blend, low-to-the-ground, unexpected, evacuation, silhouetting
CARVER	criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives
DA	Department of the Army
DD	Department of Defense (form)
FM	field manual
JP	joint publication
LOC	line of communications
MCRP	Marine Corps reference publication
MCTP	Marine Corps techniques publication
METT-TC	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations
MSS	mission support site
ODA	operational detachment–alpha
ORP	objective rally point
R&S	reconnaissance and surveillance
SALUTE	size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment
SF	Special Forces
SNAP	sex, nationality, age, and physical description
SOT-A	special operations team–alpha
SR	special reconnaissance
TA	target acquisition
TC	training circular
TIP	target intelligence package
TM	technical manual
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
USAJFKSWCS	United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
VAS	visual augmentation system

SECTION II – TERMS

clandestine operation

An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. (JP 3-05)

compromise

The known or suspected exposure of clandestine personnel, installations, or other assets or of classified information or material, to an unauthorized person. (JP 2-01.2)

covert operation

An action of activity that is planned and executed as to conceal the identity of, or permit plausible denial by, the sponsor. (JP 3-05)

detection

1. In tactical operations, the perception of an object of possible military interest but unconfirmed by recognition. 2. In surveillance, the determination and transmission by a surveillance system that an event has occurred. (JP 3-11)

exfiltration

The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means. (JP 3-50)

information collection

An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. (FM 3-55)

information superiority

The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. (JP 3-13)

joint special operations area

An area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. Also called **JSOA.** (JP 3-0)

joint special operations task force

A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a combatant command campaign or other operations. Also called **JSOTF**. (JP 3-05)

reconnaissance

A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (JP 2-0)

special operations

Activities or actions requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment, and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments. (JP 3-05)

special reconnaissance

Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. Also called **SR**. (JP 3-05)

surveillance

The systematic observation of aerospace, cyberspace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JP 3-0)

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